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A Formulaic Recitation Will Not Do:
Why the Federal Rules Demand More Detail
in Criminal Pleading
Charles Eric Hintz*
ABSTRACT
When a plaintiff files a civil lawsuit in federal court, her complaint
must satisfy certain minimum standards. Specifically, under the
prevailing understanding of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a
complaint must plead sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face, rather than mere conclusory statements.
Given the significantly higher stakes involved in criminal cases, one
might think that an even more robust requirement would exist in that
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context. But in fact a weaker pleading standard reigns. Under the
governing interpretation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c),
indictments that simply parrot the language of a statute are often
sufficient.
As this Article shows, however, that pleading balance is misguided.
The drafters of Rule 7(c) designed the Rule to be at least as stringent as
Rule 8(a), as demonstrated by the text of Rules 7(c) and 8(a), the history
of American pleading, the original Advisory Committee Note to Rule
7(c), and the drafting history of the Criminal Rules. And the drafters’
original design should govern today, notwithstanding the Supreme
Court’s amplification of the civil pleading standard in Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal. All of that means that our current
pleading regime should be rethought, that criminal defendants should
receive more protections and information about the case against them
than they presently do, and that policy arguments—which seem to favor
a stronger criminal pleading standard—are all the more critical.
Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 633
II. THE FEDERAL CIVIL & CRIMINAL PLEADING STANDARDS ........................ 636
A. The Civil Pleading Standard ........................................................ 637
B. The Criminal Pleading Standard .................................................. 639
C. Attempts to Raise the Criminal Pleading Standard ...................... 641
III. RULE 7(C) SHOULD BE INTERPRETED TO BE AT LEAST AS
STRINGENT AS RULE 8(A) ..................................................................... 643
A. Rule 7(c) Was Designed to Be at Least as Stringent
as Rule 8(a) .................................................................................. 643
1. The Sources Relevant to the Original Design
of Rule 7(c) ............................................................................ 644
a. The Text of Rule 7(c) & Rule 8(a) ................................. 644
b. The History of American Pleading ................................. 644
i. Civil Pleading........................................................... 644
ii. Criminal Pleading .................................................... 649
iii. The Relationship Between Civil & Criminal
Pleading Requirements ............................................ 652
c. The Original Advisory Committee Note to
Rule 7(c) ......................................................................... 655
d. The Drafting History of the Criminal Rules ................... 658
2. How the Sources Demonstrate that Rule 7(c) Was
Designed to Be at Least as Stringent as Rule 8(a) ................. 667
B. The Original Design of Rule 7(c) Should Govern Our
Understanding of the Rule Today ................................................ 669
1. Why Rule 7(c)’s Original Design Is Authoritative ................ 670
2. Why Twombly & Iqbal Do Not Undermine the Authority
of Rule 7(c)’s Original Design ............................................... 671
3. Concluding Comments ........................................................... 679

2021]

A FORMULAIC RECITATION WILL NOT DO

633

IV. WHY COUNTERARGUMENTS ARE UNPERSUASIVE ..................................... 680
A. Anticipated Counterargument: Rule 7(c) Does Not Require
Prosecutors to Specify the “Means” of the Crime ........................ 680
B. Counterarguments from the Courts .............................................. 682
1. Nothing in Twombly or Iqbal Suggests They Were Meant
to Apply to Criminal Cases .................................................... 682
2. A Defendant Challenging an Indictment Must Establish
Prejudice ................................................................................ 683
3. A Defendant Can Obtain a Bill of Particulars ........................ 685
4. Rule 8(a) Requires a “Showing” of Entitlement to Relief,
Whereas Rule 7(c) Does Not.................................................. 687
5. Rule 7(c) Was Designed to Reduce Technicalities,
Procedural Complexity & Detailed Allegations ..................... 687
6. Criminal Procedure & Civil Procedure Are Different ............ 687
C. Counterarguments from the Advisory Committee ....................... 688
1. Courts Uphold Bare-Bones Indictments ................................ 688
2. Minimal Pleading Is Hundreds of Years Old &
Raising the Criminal Pleading Standard Would
Be a Return to the Common Law ........................................... 688
3. Raising the Criminal Pleading Standard Would Create
Substantive Rights.................................................................. 692
V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 692

I.

INTRODUCTION

When a plaintiff files a civil lawsuit in federal court, her complaint
must satisfy certain minimum standards. Specifically, under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,”1
which has been interpreted to mean “sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face’” and not
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements.”2 If the plaintiff’s complaint fails to satisfy
those requirements, the defendant may move to dismiss it and thereby
potentially end the case.
Given the significantly higher stakes involved in criminal litigation,
one might think that a stronger pleading standard would exist in that
context—criminal defendants, one might argue, should be entitled to
more protections and information about the case against them than their
civil counterparts.3 But in fact the opposite is true. Under the prevailing

1. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
2. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted).
3. Cf., e.g., James M. Burnham, Why Don’t Courts Dismiss Indictments?, 18 GREEN
BAG 2d 347, 348–49, 351, 354–58 (2015); Russell M. Gold, Carissa Byrne Hessick & F.
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interpretation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c), which requires
that an indictment contain “a plain, concise, and definite written
statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged,”4
indictments parroting the language of a statute are often sufficient.5
Consequently, allegations devoid of particularized factual detail that
would never sustain a civil complaint are frequently deemed adequate to
allow a criminal prosecution to proceed to trial.6 As one court put it well:
[A] civil complaint that merely recited the elements of the claims
asserted and the approximate time and place that the claims arose
would be summarily dismissed, for as the Supreme Court has
explained, “a pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”
But under controlling precedent, a criminal indictment need contain
no more than this.7

The interpretation of Rule 7(c) as largely toothless, moreover, is
firmly established. It was set by no less an authority than the Supreme
Court.8 Furthermore, under the shadow of that authority, lower courts
have consistently rebuffed attempts to strengthen the criminal pleading
standard.9 And the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, the main
Andrew Hessick, Civilizing Criminal Settlements, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1607, 1612–13, 1632–
33, 1640–44 (2017); Robert L. Weinberg, Applying the Rationale of Twombly to Provide
Safeguards for the Accused in Federal Criminal Cases, 7 ADVANCE 45, 51–52 (2013)
[hereinafter Weinberg, Applying Twombly]; Robert L. Weinberg, Iqbal for the Accused?,
CHAMPION, July 2010, at 31–32 [hereinafter Weinberg, Iqbal].
4. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 109–10 (2007).
6. Compare, e.g., United States v. Guler, No. 1:07CV130 HEA, 2007 WL 4593504,
at *3, 5 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 21, 2007) (approving of the following indictment: “On or about
the 13th day of July, 2007, in Shannon County, within the Eastern District of Missouri,
the defendant, KARRIE L. GULER, knowingly did forcibly assault, resist, oppose,
impede, intimidate, and interfere with Teresa McKinney, a Ranger with the National Park
Service, while she was engaged in her official duties, in violation of Title 18, United
States Code, Section 111”), with, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 111(a) (imposing criminal liability
upon “[w]hoever—(1) forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or
interferes with any person designated in section 1114 of this title while engaged in or on
account of the performance of official duties”). Cf., e.g., Parker v. Landry, 935 F.3d 9,
13–14 (1st Cir. 2019) (“[T]he [civil] complaint must do more than merely parrot the
contours of a cause of action.”); United States v. Raniere, 384 F. Supp. 3d 282, 302
(E.D.N.Y. 2019) (indicating that, under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, which imposes both criminal and civil liability, the “pleading
standards are different” in civil and criminal cases (and the standard is weaker in
criminal cases), even though “the same elements [must be proved] at trial”); United
States v. Arms, No. 14-CR-78, 2015 WL 5022640, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 24, 2015)
(similar).
7. United States v. Hansen, 428 F. Supp. 3d 1200, 1203 (D. Utah 2019) (citation
omitted).
8. See Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. at 109–10.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Vaughn, 722 F.3d 918, 926 (7th Cir. 2013).
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rulemaking body for the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, rejected a
2016 proposal to clarify that indictments should be subject to the same
pleading requirements as civil complaints.10
Commentators have taken notice of the current balance between our
civil and criminal pleading standards and started to present arguments as
to why that balance is inappropriate, why the criminal pleading standard
should be aligned with the civil standard, and why the criminal pleading
standard ended up being as forgiving as it is.11 More importantly for our
purposes, however, they have begun to make textual and historical
claims about the meaning of Rule 7(c). For example, some have
suggested that Rule 7(c) requires more factual specificity than Rule 8(a)
because Rule 7(c) refers to pleading “facts,” whereas Rule 8(a) does
not.12 Likewise, some have begun to observe that the drafters of Rule
8(a) omitted references to pleading “facts” that appeared in pre-Federal
Rules civil pleading codes and that Rule 7(c)’s language is comparable to
those codes.13 Additionally, a commentator has noted that the original
Advisory Committee Note to Rule 7(c) includes cross-references to Rule
8.14 Finally, one scholar has indicated that the drafters of Rule 7(c)
sought to adopt the pleading standard of the Civil Rules rather than a
more stringent alternative.15
Those claims are powerful and suggest that Rule 7(c) should be
understood differently than it is today. But the literature on the proper
legal interpretation of Rule 7(c) is still in nascent and underdeveloped
form. Commentators have generally raised these textual and historical
claims in passing, without complete analysis, and/or in support of
broader arguments, and no one has fully examined and synthesized the
10. See Minutes, Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, U.S. COURTS 19–21 (Apr.
18, 2016), https://bit.ly/2QGBus8; see also Letter from James M. Burnham to Hon.
Donald W. Molloy, Chair, Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules 1–3 (Feb. 1, 2016),
https://bit.ly/3kjcZvD.
11. See, e.g., Ion Meyn, The Haves of Procedure, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1765,
1770–73, 1804–12 (2019) [hereinafter Meyn, The Haves]; Ion Meyn, The Unbearable
Lightness of Criminal Procedure, 42 AM. J. CRIM. L. 39, 40–41, 55–57 (2014)
[hereinafter Meyn, Unbearable Lightness]; Burnham, supra note 3, at 348–49; Gold et
al., supra note 3, at 1612–13; Weinberg, Applying Twombly, supra note 3, at 49, 53;
Weinberg, Iqbal, supra note 3, at 29–32.
12. See 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.1(d) n.41 (4th ed. 2020); Jesse Jenike-Godshalk, Comment,
“Plausible Cause”?: How Criminal Procedure Can Illuminate the U.S. Supreme Court’s
New General Pleading Standard in Civil Suits, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 791, 806 (2010);
Meyn, The Haves, supra note 11, at 1809–10; Weinberg, Applying Twombly, supra note
3, at 49; Weinberg, Iqbal, supra note 3, at 29.
13. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, § 19.1(d) & n.41; Weinberg, Applying
Twombly, supra note 3, at 49; Weinberg, Iqbal, supra note 3, at 29.
14. See Jenike-Godshalk, supra note 12, at 806 & n.128.
15. See Ion Meyn, Why Civil and Criminal Procedure Are So Different: A
Forgotten History, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 697, 715–16 (2017).
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sources relevant to the meaning of Rule 7(c) to determine how the Rule
should be interpreted today. This Article fills that gap, serving as the first
scholarly assessment of how Rule 7(c) should be read in perspective of a
thorough investigation of the Rule’s text, history, context, and similar
interpretive resources. It concludes that Rule 7(c) was originally
designed to be at least as rigorous as Rule 8(a) and that the Rule should
be so construed today.
Those conclusions are important. First, they demonstrate that the
existing pleading standard balance is misguided and should be rethought.
Second, they suggest that criminal defendants should receive more
safeguards and information about the case against them than they
presently do.16 Third, they render policy arguments all the more
important. If we are to maintain a pleading regime that is questionable as
a matter of law, it should at least be strongly supported by normative
considerations. And if it is not or if those considerations cut in the other
direction—which seems to be the case17—then the need for change is
even more urgent and pronounced.18
This Article’s analysis proceeds as follows. Part II describes the
current state of pleading law, including an introduction to the prevailing
pleading standards and an overview of recent efforts to alter the criminal
standard. Part III examines the text of Rules 7(c) and 8(a), the history of
American pleading, the original Advisory Committee Note to Rule 7(c),
and the drafting history of the Criminal Rules, and it concludes that these
sources together demonstrate that Rule 7(c) was designed to be at least as
stringent as Rule 8(a) and that the Rule should be so interpreted today.
Part IV engages with a host of counterarguments but ultimately finds
them unpersuasive. Part V concludes.
II.

THE FEDERAL CIVIL & CRIMINAL PLEADING STANDARDS

Before exploring how Rule 7(c) should be interpreted, it is first
necessary to understand the state of the law today. Consequently, this
Part discusses the prevailing civil and criminal pleading standards, as
well as recent attempts to strengthen the criminal standard.

16. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Burnham, supra note 3, at 348–54, 357–62; Gold et al., supra note 3,
at 1612–13, 1632–33, 1640–44; Meyn, Unbearable Lightness, supra note 11, at 55–57;
Weinberg, Applying Twombly, supra note 3, at 48–52; Weinberg, Iqbal, supra note 3, at
29–32.
18. Although my conclusions amplify the importance of policy arguments, this
Article does not focus on those arguments. Rather, it concentrates on ascertaining the best
legal construction of Rule 7(c). That scope has been chosen because doing full justice to
both the legal and normative issues requires examining them separately, and I plan to
address the normative aspects of our criminal pleading system in later work.
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A. The Civil Pleading Standard
As introduced above, a federal civil action begins with the filing of
a complaint, which describes the plaintiff’s claim.19 That document must
meet certain minimum standards.20 Those standards are established by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which says that “[a] pleading that
states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”21 If the complaint
violates that Rule, the defendant can move to dismiss it for “failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted” pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), thereby requiring the plaintiff to file a new complaint or
terminating the action.22
For much of Rule 8(a)’s history, the civil pleading standard was
governed by the Supreme Court’s 1957 decision in Conley v. Gibson.23
There, the Court interpreted Rule 8(a) to mean that “a complaint should
not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief.”24 It made clear that Rule 8(a) does
“not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases
his claim” but rather just “‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that
will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.”25 In short, the Court largely rejected “a call
for the pleading of specific facts.”26 And many courts read Conley to
mean that “a wholly conclusory statement of claim would survive a
motion to dismiss whenever the pleadings left open the possibility that a
19. See FED. R. CIV. P. 3, 8(a).
20. See id. R. 8(a).
21. Id.
22. Id. R. 12(b); see, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007);
Ríos-Campbell v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 927 F.3d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 2019); O’Boyle v.
Real Time Resolutions, Inc., 910 F.3d 338, 346–47 (7th Cir. 2018).
23. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–48 (1957).
24. Id. at 45–46.
25. Id. at 47 (citation omitted).
26. A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims in the Post-Conley Era, 52
HOW. L.J. 99, 105 (2008); see also Conley, 355 U.S. at 47–48 (“[S]implified ‘notice
pleading’ is made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial
procedures established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and
defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues. . . . The Federal Rules
reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may
be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to
facilitate a proper decision on the merits.”); cf. Has the Supreme Court Limited
Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. 5–6 (2009) [hereinafter Access to Courts Hearing] (statement of Stephen B.
Burbank, Professor, University of Pennsylvania) (“[A] number of Supreme Court
decisions including . . . Conley v. Gibson, embraced the concept of ‘notice pleading,’
permitting plaintiffs to allege very little in their complaints, and that in general terms.”
(citation omitted)).
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plaintiff might later establish some ‘set of [undisclosed] facts’ to support
recovery” or that “any statement revealing the theory of the claim
w[ould] suffice unless its factual impossibility [were] shown from the
face of the pleadings.”27
The Conley pleading standard, however, did not last. In Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court forced the “no set of
facts” language into retirement.28 It concluded that that language could
be, and had been, read too narrowly, that the import of Conley had been
misunderstood, and that a literal understanding of Conley had been
widely rejected.29 Thus, it said, Conley’s “no set of facts” language “is
best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading
standard: once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported
by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the
complaint.”30
The Twombly decision replaced Conley’s pleading standard with a
requirement that a complaint contain “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face,” that is, enough “to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level.”31 It said that “a plaintiff’s obligation
to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.”32 And the Court rejected the view “that the
Federal Rules somehow dispensed with the pleading of facts
altogether.”33 Rather, a more stringent standard was needed to “reflect[]
the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) that the ‘plain statement’
possess enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief’” and
“give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests.”34
27. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561–62 (first alteration in original); see Am. Dental Ass’n
v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1288–89 (11th Cir. 2010); see also, e.g., Kolupa v.
Roselle Park Dist., 438 F.3d 713, 714 (7th Cir. 2006) (“It is enough to name the plaintiff
and the defendant, state the nature of the grievance, and give a few tidbits (such as the
date) that will let the defendant investigate.”); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices
and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 2237, 2241 & n.17 (1989) (explaining that the effect of Conley was to allow
“[p]leading in general terms,” such that a plaintiff could “prosecute another party without
having to explain exactly why the party is being charged”).
28. See, e.g., Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561–63; Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the
Dilemmas of Modern American Procedure, 93 JUDICATURE 109, 113 (2009); Access to
Courts Hearing, supra note 26, at 7 (statement of Stephen B. Burbank).
29. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561–63.
30. Id. at 563.
31. Id. at 555, 570.
32. Id. at 555 (alteration in original).
33. Id. at 555 n.3.
34. Id. at 555, 557 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted); see also id. at
555 n.3 (“While, for most types of cases, the Federal Rules eliminated the cumbersome
requirement that a claimant ‘set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim,’
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Shortly after Twombly, the Supreme Court refined its new
understanding of Rule 8(a) in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.35 First of all, it clarified
that Twombly’s approach was universal and not, as some anticipated or
believed, limited to specific contexts.36 Additionally, the Court explained
that, under Twombly, Rule 8(a) “does not require ‘detailed factual
allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation,” “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of
‘further factual enhancement,’” or “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.”37 Indeed,
it maintained, “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the
hypertechnical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not
unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more
than conclusions.”38 Accordingly, it determined that, in deciding motions
to dismiss, courts should functionally ignore allegations that “are no
more than conclusions” by refusing to “assume their veracity,” in
contrast to “well-pleaded factual allegations,” which should be taken as
true and evaluated to “determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.”39 And the Court made clear that that “plausibility”
standard is met only if the complaint contains “factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.”40
In sum, under the prevailing civil pleading regime, legal
conclusions—for example, allegations merely tracking the language of a
cause of action—cannot satisfy Rule 8(a). Rather, factual allegations
sufficient to plausibly warrant relief are necessary.
B. The Criminal Pleading Standard
Although there are differences, federal criminal and civil cases are
instituted similarly.41 On the criminal side, often after several preliminary

Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to
relief.” (citation omitted)).
35. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–80 (2009).
36. See, e.g., id. at 684; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 596 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Starr v.
County of Los Angeles, 659 F.3d 850, 851–52 (9th Cir. 2011) (O’Scannlain, J.,
dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc); Access to Courts Hearing, supra note 26, at 8,
11 (statement of Stephen B. Burbank); Burbank, supra note 28, at 114–15.
37. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (first alteration in original) (citations omitted).
38. Id. at 678–79.
39. Id. at 679.
40. Id. at 678.
41. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Right to “Plead Out” Issues and Block
the Admission of Prejudicial Evidence: The Differential Treatment of Civil Litigants and
the Criminal Accused as a Denial of Equal Protection, 40 EMORY L.J. 341, 353 (1991).
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steps,42 the government files a “pleading . . . initiat[ing] the formal
charge against the accused,” which, in felony prosecutions, is termed an
“indictment” or “information.”43 That pleading, similar to a civil
complaint, must satisfy certain requirements. Specifically, under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c), “[t]he indictment or information must
be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts
constituting the offense charged.”44 If an indictment or information fails
to satisfy Rule 7(c), the defendant may move to dismiss it for “lack of
specificity” under Rule 12(b)(3)(B)(iii) or “failure to state an offense”
under Rule 12(b)(3)(B)(v).45 Such a dismissal would either require a new
pleading or terminate the prosecution.46
The Supreme Court’s criminal pleading jurisprudence has not
shifted as markedly as its civil pleading jurisprudence, so we can begin
with the Court’s most recent decision interpreting Rule 7(c), United
States v. Resendiz-Ponce, issued in 2007.47 The question the Court
decided was whether an indictment for attempted unlawful reentry was
defective if it failed to allege “‘any specific overt act that is a substantial
step’ toward the completion of the unlawful reentry” and, instead, simply
stated that the defendant “attempted” to reenter the country at a particular
time and place.48 It held that such an indictment was not defective.49
In reaching that decision, the Court made several points regarding
the criminal pleading standard. Specifically, it said that “an indictment
parroting the language of a federal criminal statute is often sufficient.”50
Additionally, the Court explained:

42. See, e.g., 1 ANDREW D. LEIPOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 41, 71,
91, 121 (4th ed. 2021).
43. Id. § 121. “An indictment is a criminal charge returned to the court by a grand
jury,” whereas “[a]n information is a criminal charge prepared by the prosecutor.” Id.
44. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1).
45. Id. R. 12(b)(3); see, e.g., United States v. Carter, 465 F.3d 658, 662 (6th Cir.
2006) (per curiam); United States v. Tull, Crim. No. 15-622(SDW), 2018 WL 1128771,
at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 1, 2018); United States v. Adcox, Criminal Action No. CR 15-00036,
2017 WL 2489998, at *2 (W.D. La. June 7, 2017); United States v. Cook, Crim. No. 1650-SLR, 2017 WL 106303, at *1 (D. Del. Jan. 11, 2017); United States v. Murgio, 209 F.
Supp. 3d 698, 705–06 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Slough, 679 F. Supp. 2d 55, 58 (D.D.C. 2010).
47. See United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 109–10 (2007); Hamling v.
United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974) (reaching a similar conclusion to ResendizPonce); United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 377–78 (1953) (same).
48. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. at 104–05, 107 (citation omitted).
49. See id. at 107, 111.
50. Id. at 109. The Court acknowledged that “there are crimes that must be charged
with greater specificity,” but it treated that exception as a narrow one applicable only in
unique circumstances—not there present—where guilt turns “crucially upon . . . a
specific identification of fact.” Id. at 110 (citation omitted).
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[T]he Federal Rules “were designed to eliminate technicalities in
criminal pleadings and are to be construed to secure simplicity in
procedure.” While detailed allegations might well have been required
under common-law pleading rules, they surely are not contemplated
by Rule 7(c)(1), which provides that an indictment “shall be a plain,
concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts
constituting the offense charged.”51

In sum, unlike in the civil context, an indictment that is largely
conclusory and just tracks the language of a statute is generally adequate
under the Federal Rules.52 Accordingly, the Federal Rules demand much
less of criminal pleadings than civil ones, and pleadings that would
certainly fail as civil complaints are often deemed sufficient as
indictments.53
C. Attempts to Raise the Criminal Pleading Standard
Resendiz-Ponce was decided months before Twombly and years
before Iqbal.54 Consequently, there have been numerous attempts to align
the criminal pleading standard with the Twombly-Iqbal civil standard. All
have been unsuccessful.
Most of those efforts have involved litigation. Criminal defendants
have repeatedly argued that indictments should have to comply with
Twombly and Iqbal.55 Lower courts have generally rejected those
arguments on the grounds that binding decisions hold to the contrary and

51. Id. (citations omitted).
52. See id. at 107–09.
53. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
54. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 662 (2009) (decided May 18, 2009); Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 544 (2007) (decided May 21, 2007); ResendizPonce, 549 U.S. at 102 (decided January 9, 2007).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Gerebizza, 720 F. App’x 302, 305 (7th Cir. 2017) (per
curiam); United States v. Vaughn, 722 F.3d 918, 926 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v.
Hansen, 428 F. Supp. 3d 1200, 1201–03 (D. Utah 2019); United States v. Bundy, No.
2:16-cr-00046-PAL-GMN, 2017 WL 387204, at *6 (D. Nev. Jan. 11, 2017), adopted by
amended order, 2018 WL 523352, at *1 (Jan. 23, 2018); United States v. Coley, No.
CR415-187, 2016 WL 743432, at *1–3 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 23, 2016), adopted, 2016 WL
1032876, at *1 (Mar. 14, 2016); United States v. Hossain, No. 2:13-cr-00119-GMNGWF, 2014 WL 4354121, at *3 n.1 (D. Nev. June 23, 2014), adopted, 2014 WL
4354125, at *1–4 (Sept. 2, 2014); United States v. Calvente, No. S3 12 Cr. 732(WHP),
2013 WL 4038952, at *2 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2013); United States v. Castillo
Madrigal, No. 12-cr-62-bbc-04, 2013 WL 12099089, at *1–2 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 30, 2013),
adopted, 2013 WL 12099088, at *1 (Feb. 21, 2013); United States v. Homaune, 898 F.
Supp. 2d 153, 164 (D.D.C. 2012); United States v. Mensah, No. 12-CR-0071-003-CVE,
2012 WL 2466393, at *2 (N.D. Okla. June 27, 2012); United States v. Lockhart, No. 11cr-90-wmc, 2012 WL 12888034, at *1–2 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 17, 2012); United States v.
Northcutt, No. 07-60220-CR, 2008 WL 162753, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 16, 2008).
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that no authority supports a heightened criminal pleading standard.56
Those courts, however, have also raised substantive legal arguments
against amplifying the criminal pleading standard, including: (1) that
nothing in Twombly or Iqbal suggests those decisions apply to criminal
cases;57 (2) that a defendant challenging the sufficiency of an indictment
must establish prejudice to prevail;58 (3) that a defendant who wants
more detail about his case may seek a bill of particulars;59 (4) that Rule
8(a) requires a “showing” that the pleader is entitled to relief, whereas
Rule 7(c) does not;60 (5) that the Criminal Rules were designed to reduce
technicalities, procedural complexity, and detailed allegations;61 and (6)
that criminal and civil procedure are just different, regarding, for
example, the protections defendants receive and the burdens of moving
past the pleadings into discovery.62
Another attempt at altering the criminal pleading standard involved
a proposal to the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules.63 In 2016, a
56. See, e.g., Gerebizza, 720 F. App’x at 305; Vaughn, 722 F.3d at 926; Hansen,
428 F. Supp. 3d at 1202–03; United States v. Adcox, Criminal Action No. 15-00036,
2017 WL 2489998, at *4 (W.D. La. June 7, 2017); Coley, 2016 WL 743432, at *2;
Calvente, 2013 WL 4038952, at *2 n.1; Castillo Madrigal, 2013 WL 12099089, at *1–2;
Homaune, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 164; Mensah, 2012 WL 2466393, at *2; Lockhart, 2012
WL 12888034, at *1–2; Northcutt, 2008 WL 162753, at *2.
57. See Coley, 2016 WL 743432, at *1–2; Castillo Madrigal, 2013 WL 12099089,
at *1.
58. See Castillo Madrigal, 2013 WL 12099089, at *2.
59. See Vaughn, 722 F.3d at 926. “A bill of particulars is a formal written statement
by the prosecutor providing details of the charges against the defendant” that a defendant
can seek if the indictment, though legally sufficient, does not provide enough information
“to enable [her] to prepare adequately for trial.” LEIPOLD, supra note 42, § 130.
60. See Coley, 2016 WL 743432, at *3.
61. See id. at *1 & n.2; see also United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 110
(2007) (making the same point).
62. See Vaughn, 722 F.3d at 926; United States v. Bundy, No. 2:16-cr-00046-PALGMN, 2017 WL 387204, at *6 (D. Nev. Jan. 11, 2017), adopted by amended order, 2018
WL 523352, at *1 (Jan. 23, 2018); Coley, 2016 WL 743432, at *3; Castillo Madrigal,
2013 WL 12099089, at *2.
63. The Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules is the main rulemaking body for
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. That Committee is accountable to the Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, which is overseen by the Judicial
Conference of the United States and which ultimately makes recommendations to the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court
Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 892
(1999). Rules are developed as follows:
A proposed rule is first considered by the Advisory Committee. If the Advisory
Committee approves the proposal, it is then reviewed by the Standing
Committee and finally by the Judicial Conference before being forwarded to
the Supreme Court. If the Supreme Court concurs, the proposal is transmitted to
Congress, which then has roughly seven months to exercise a veto. In the
absence of a veto, the proposed rule goes into effect.
Id.; see also How the Rulemaking Process Works, U.S. COURTS, https://bit.ly/3sCJCr9
(last visited Apr. 26, 2021) (providing a similar overview of the rulemaking process). The
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formal recommendation was submitted to the Committee proposing that
“Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B)(v)—governing
dismissal of an indictment for failure to state an offense”—be altered “to
clarify that the standard for dismissal of a criminal indictment is meant to
be consistent with the standard for dismissal of a civil complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”64
When the Committee took up the proposal, a number of members
expressed interest.65 Nevertheless, several legal arguments were raised
against it, including: (1) that criminal pleading practices are set by court
decisions that uphold bare-bones indictments; (2) “that minimal pleading
in criminal cases is hundreds of years old, not something new,” and that
the proposal seemed like a “return to the old common law pleading
rules”; and (3) that “this proposal seeks to create new substantive rights,
which is beyond the authority of the Rules Committee.”66 After brief
discussion, the Chairman summarily quashed the measure.67
III. RULE 7(C) SHOULD BE INTERPRETED TO BE AT LEAST AS
STRINGENT AS RULE 8(A)
The current pleading regime subjects indictments to much lighter
scrutiny than civil complaints. And that regime is deeply entrenched,
supported, as it is, by Supreme Court decisions, lower courts, and the
Advisory Committee. Nevertheless, it is ill-advised: as this Part explains,
the drafters of Rule 7(c) fashioned the Rule to be at least as stringent as
Rule 8(a), and that original design should govern our interpretation of
Rule 7(c) today.
A. Rule 7(c) Was Designed to Be at Least as Stringent as Rule 8(a)
When the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules assembled in the
1940s to design a new set of criminal procedure rules for the federal
courts, it could have created any system it thought prudent—within
statutory and constitutional limits. Notwithstanding that range of choice,
however, the drafters crafted Rule 7(c) to be at least as stringent as Rule
8(a).

rulemaking process has also changed over time. For example, the Advisory Committee
originally reported to the Supreme Court directly. See, e.g., Preface to 1 DRAFTING
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE xi–xvi (Madeleine J. Wilken
& Nicholas Triffin eds., 1991) [hereinafter DRAFTING HISTORY].
64. Letter from James M. Burnham to Hon. Donald W. Molloy, supra note 10, at 1.
65. See U.S. COURTS, supra note 10, at 19–21.
66. Id. at 20.
67. See id. at 21.
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The literature has begun to highlight some of the sources that are
suggestive of that fact.68 But to fully understand Rule 7(c)’s original
design, it is necessary to consider the sources holistically and examine
them thoroughly. Thus, this Section first offers a detailed description of
(and some observations about) the relevant sources—the text of Rule
7(c) and Rule 8(a), the history of pleading in the United States, the
original Advisory Committee Note to Rule 7(c), and the drafting history
of the Criminal Rules—and then analyzes their meaning and implications
for Rule 7(c) as a whole.
1. The Sources Relevant to the Original Design of Rule 7(c)
a. The Text of Rule 7(c) & Rule 8(a)
To understand Rule 7(c), the first source to consider is the text of
the Rule and its civil counterpart, Rule 8(a). Rule 7(c) provides that
“[t]he indictment or information must be a plain, concise, and definite
written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense
charged.”69 And Rule 8(a) states that “[a] pleading that states a claim for
relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.”70
Those provisions will be analyzed below, but it is important to
highlight two key points at this juncture. First, Rule 7(c) requires
pleading “essential facts,” but Rule 8(a) makes no reference to facts
whatsoever. Second, both Rule 7(c) and Rule 8(a) read effectively the
same today as they did originally.71
b. The History of American Pleading
The second source to consider is the history of pleading in the
United States. This Subsection first describes the history of civil
pleading, then discusses the history of criminal pleading, and finally
explains the historical relationship between civil and criminal pleading
rules.
i.

Civil Pleading

The history of American civil pleading begins with the common
law.72 At common law, the ultimate objective of pleading was to narrow
68. See supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text.
69. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1).
70. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
71. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c) (1946); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (1938).
72. See, e.g., James V. Bilek, Comment, Twombly, Iqbal, and Rule 8(c): Assessing
the Proper Standard to Apply to Affirmative Defenses, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 377, 379–80
(2011).
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the issues for trial.73 To facilitate that narrowing, and for a host of other
reasons, “highly technical rules” developed that, for centuries, elevated
pleading to the status of “a science to be formulated and cultivated.”74 As
one early-twentieth-century treatise explained:
[Common law pleading was characterized by] the extreme nicety,
precision, and accuracy which were demanded by the courts in the
framing of allegations, in averring either the facts from which the
primary rights of the parties arose, or those which constituted the
breach of such rights, in the use of technical phrases and formulas, in
the certainty of statement produced by negativing almost all possible
conclusions different from that affirmed by the pleader, in the
numerous repetitions of the same averment, and finally in the
invention and employment of a language and mode of expression
utterly unlike the ordinary spoken or written English, and
meaningless to any person but a trained expert.75

Furthermore, although the common law was said to require pleading “the
material, issuable facts constituting the cause of action,”76 it often
actually required alleging fictions, conclusions, and generalities.77 Put
another way, “common law pleading [came] in large measure to consist
of formal general statements which did not set forth the details of the
pleader’s case.”78
Frustrations with those and other aspects of common law pleading
ultimately led to a desire for reform.79 In the United States, that desire
culminated in a new code of procedure in New York—termed the “Field
73. See, e.g., CHARLES E. CLARK, CLARK ON CODE PLEADING 12–13 (2d ed. 1947);
Bilek, supra note 72, at 379–81.
74. CLARK, supra note 73, at 12–15; see also, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz &
Christopher E. Appel, Rational Pleading in the Modern World of Civil Litigation: The
Lessons and Public Policy Benefits of Twombly and Iqbal, 33 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
1107, 1112–13 (2010).
75. JOHN NORTON POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES: REMEDIES AND REMEDIAL RIGHTS BY
THE CIVIL ACTION ACCORDING TO THE REFORMED AMERICAN PROCEDURE – A TREATISE
ADAPTED TO USE IN ALL THE STATES AND TERRITORIES WHERE THAT SYSTEM PREVAILS §
403 (5th ed. 1929).
76. Id. § 402.
77. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark, The Complaint in Code Pleading, 35 YALE L.J. 259,
259 (1926); James R. Maxeiner, Pleading and Access to Civil Procedure: Historical and
Comparative Reflections on Iqbal, a Day in Court and a Decision According to Law, 114
PENN ST. L. REV. 1257, 1274 (2010); Jack B. Weinstein & Daniel H. Distler, Comments
on Procedural Reform, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 518, 520 (1957); CLARK, supra note 73, at
225; POMEROY, supra note 75, §§ 404–05.
78. Clark, supra note 77, at 259.
79. See, e.g., ARPHAXED LOOMIS, DAVID GRAHAM & DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, FIRST
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS, Leg. 71, 1st Sess., § 118
cmt. (N.Y. 1848); CLARK, supra note 73, at 17, 21–22, 225–26; Clark, supra note 77, at
259; Maxeiner, supra note 77, at 1272–73; Schwartz & Appel, supra note 74, at 1114–
15; Bilek, supra note 72, at 379–81.
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Code” because it “was in large measure the work of David Dudley
Field”—and the idea of “code pleading” spread widely to other
American jurisdictions.80
The codes ushered in numerous paradigm-shifting changes, but one
of the most important was that they replaced the technical, complex, and
opaque common law system of “issue pleading” with “fact pleading,”
under which pleadings were just to state the actual ultimate facts and not
evidence or legal conclusions.81 As one prominent treatise-writer put it,
under the codes, only “dry, naked, actual facts” should be pleaded, and
“[e]very attempt to combine fact and law, to give the facts a legal
coloring and aspect, [or] to present them in their legal bearing upon the
issues rather than in their actual naked simplicity” would constitute “an
averment of law instead of fact” and thus violate the principles of code
pleading.82
The reformers used distinctive language to reflect their move to fact
pleading. The Field Code “required that the complaint contain ‘[a]
statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and
concise language, without repetition.’”83 Similar language was adopted
by other code states.84
The codes, however, faced their own problems. For example,
because they focused on alleging “facts,” there arose serious “practical
difficult[ies] in distinguishing between allegations of ultimate
fact . . . and legal conclusions,” which, in turn, led to the resurgence of
complexity and technicality in pleading.85 Commentators, accordingly,
began to take issue with code pleading. For example, one writer
lamented:
80. CLARK, supra note 73, at 21–24; accord, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules
Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1038 (1982); Maxeiner, supra note 77, at
1271, 1273–74; Schwartz & Appel, supra note 74, at 1114–16; Weinstein & Distler,
supra note 77, at 520; Bilek, supra note 72, at 381; see also LOOMIS ET AL., supra note
79, § 118 cmt.
81. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 73, at 22–23, 225; Clark, supra note 77, at 259–62;
Maxeiner, supra note 77, at 1273–74; Schwartz & Appel, supra note 74, at 1114; Bilek,
supra note 72, at 381–82.
82. POMEROY, supra note 75, § 423; see also, e.g., Charles E. Clark, Comment,
Pleading Negligence, 32 YALE L.J. 483, 484 (1923); David Marcus, The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and Legal Realism as a Jurisprudence of Law Reform, 44 GA. L. REV.
433, 476 (2010); Clark, supra note 77, at 261.
83. Schwartz & Appel, supra note 74, at 1115–16 (alteration in original) (citation
omitted); accord, e.g., Marcus, supra note 82, at 476.
84. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 73, at 210–11, 210 n.2, 225–27, 227 n.54;
POMEROY, supra note 75, §§ 401, 411; see also Scott Dodson, Comparative
Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 441, 447 (2010).
85. Schwartz & Appel, supra note 74, at 1116; accord, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, The
Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
433, 438 (1986); CLARK, supra note 73, at 225–28; Weinstein & Distler, supra note 77,
at 520–21; Bilek, supra note 72, at 381–82, 381 n.31.
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It is a fruitful source of the delay in litigation which is so commonly
condemned; it causes a great waste of time on the part of appellate
courts; it no doubt wastes much time in the trial courts . . . ; and
occasionally it leads to an improper conclusion of a particular
litigation.86

These state-law developments impacted federal pleading. Prior to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, law and equity remained divided in
the federal courts.87 Equity was governed by the Federal Equity Rules,
under which “the code system substantially prevailed.”88 And “[f]or
actions at law, Congress’s passage of the Conformity Act in 1872
required that federal district courts follow the procedure of the state in
which the court sat, which varied between common law and code
pleading.”89
Efforts at reforming federal civil procedure ultimately bore fruit in
the 1930s.90 “In 1934, Congress enacted the Rules Enabling Act,
authorizing the Supreme Court to promulgate uniform rules governing
practice and procedure in the federal courts.”91 The Court then quickly
appointed an Advisory Committee to draft the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.92
The Advisory Committee, “[s]obered by the fate of the Field
Code . . . set out to devise a procedural system . . . in which the preferred
disposition [would be] on the merits, by jury trial, after full disclosure
through discovery.”93 With respect to pleading, the drafters created—in
Rule 8(a)—what they viewed as “a very simple, concise system of
allegation and defense” requiring only “very brief and direct
allegations,”94 based on the philosophy that pleadings should “do little

86. Clarke B. Whittier, Notice Pleading, 31 HARV. L. REV. 501, 506 (1918).
87. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 73, at 31.
88. Id.; see also, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 234 F. 127, 137
(E.D. Mo. 1916); 5 ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY KANE & A. BENJAMIN SPENCER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1218 (3d ed. 2021); Amber A. Pelot, Casenote,
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly: Mere Adjustment or Stringent New Requirement in
Pleading?, 59 MERCER L. REV. 1371, 1374 (2008).
89. Schwartz & Appel, supra note 74, at 1117; accord, e.g., Charles B. Campbell, A
“Plausible” Showing After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 9 NEV. L.J. 1, 10–11 (2008);
see also Imre S. Szalai, An Obituary for the Federal Arbitration Act: An Older Cousin to
Modern Civil Procedure, 2010 J. DISP. RESOL. 391, 402–06 (2010) (describing the history
of conformity procedures in the federal courts before the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure); Burbank, supra note 80, at 1036–42 (same).
90. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 80, at 1035–98 (offering a comprehensive history
of the federal procedural reform movement).
91. Schwartz & Appel, supra note 74, at 1117.
92. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 63, at 894.
93. Marcus, supra note 85, at 439.
94. Charles E. Clark, Fundamental Changes Effected by the New Federal Rules I,
15 TENN. L. REV. 551, 552 (1939).
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more than sketch the type of battle that is to follow.”95 Indeed, Rule 8(a)
was “designed to . . . reduce the pleading requirements to a minimum,”
“make[] pleadings relatively unimportant,”96 and impose “no fixed and
certain rule as to the detail required.”97 And the drafters “studiously
avoided using the term[] ‘facts’ . . . which [gave] so much trouble in
Code Pleading.”98 Rule 8(a) and the other Civil Rules were adopted by
the Supreme Court in 1937 and went into effect in 1938.99
Not everyone was enamored of Rule 8(a)’s design, however. For
example, in the early 1950s, the Judicial Conference of the Ninth Circuit
approved a resolution that Rule 8(a) should be amended to read—
evoking the code pleading regime of days past—“substantially as
follows: . . . ‘(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief, which statement shall contain the facts
constituting a cause of action.’”100 The Conference did so apparently
because it felt that Rule 8(a) had been too liberally construed and should
95. James Wm. Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised
by the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEO. L.J. 551, 559 (1937).
96. Id. at 561.
97. Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 316–17
(1938).
98. Armistead M. Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L. REV. 261,
263 n.9 (1939); accord, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 575 (2007)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Edson R. Sunderland, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 5,
12 (1938); Access to Courts Hearing, supra note 26, at 4–5, 12, 17 (statement of Stephen
B. Burbank); Burbank, supra note 28, at 115, 117 & n.83; Marcus, supra note 85, at 439;
Weinstein & Distler, supra note 77, at 522. For additional discussion of, and support for,
the foregoing points in this paragraph, see infra Section III.B.2.
99. See FED. R. CIV. P. historical note. In designing Rule 8(a), its drafters did not
entirely abandon history. For example, they indicated that, in certain respects, the
pleadings they anticipated would satisfy common law and code requirements. See Clark,
supra note 94, at 565 (asserting that the model complaint for negligence contained in the
Civil Rules, discussed infra Section III.B.2, “would be good in at least most of the
jurisdictions of the United States” and that other model forms were “really common law
forms from the old action of assumpsit, including the common counts in assumpsit”). In
fact, the drafters of Rule 8(a) drew directly on the common law’s allowance of general
averments. See Clark, supra note 97, at 309 (explaining that, under the common law, “in
such usual cases as claims for debt or negligence a simple form of general allegation was
permissible” and that this “was carried . . . directly into the new federal rules”); id. at 316
(“[T]he model [of pleading under the Civil Rules] is the simple, direct, and rather general
statement familiar to generations of lawyers by its use from common-law times to the
present.”); see also id. at 309 (“[S]ome of the basic illustrative forms of pleading issued
by the Court as an appendix to these new rules come directly from the common law.”).
Nevertheless, they made clear that “[t]he real test of a good pleading under the new rules
is not . . . whether the allegations would be deemed good at common law” but rather
“whether information is given sufficient to enable the party to plead and to prepare for
trial.” Sunderland, supra note 98, at 12; cf. Access to Courts Hearing, supra note 26, at 4
(statement of Stephen B. Burbank) (“[T]he committee wanted to escape the confinement
of . . . common law procedure.”). And again, what the drafters thought of as sufficient
pleading was quite minimal. See supra notes 93–98 and accompanying text.
100. Claim or Cause of Action, 13 F.R.D. 253, 253 (1952).
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make clear that “ultimate facts” must be pleaded.101 That proposal was
rejected.102
ii.

Criminal Pleading

The history of American criminal pleading also begins with the
common law. Under that system, criminal pleading was—like its civil
counterpart—characterized by excessive technicality, intricacy, and
formality, largely driven by the severity of punishments at common
law.103 As one commentator explained in the 1920s:
101. See id. at 264–65, 271–75.
102. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 582–83 (2007) (Stevens,
J., dissenting); Marcus, supra note 85, at 445. The Advisory Committee responded by
proposing an Advisory Committee Note for Rule 8(a) indicating that critics had
erroneously assumed “the rule does not require the averment of any information as to
what has actually happened” and clarifying that the Rule indeed “envisages the statement
of circumstances, occurrences, and events.” ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL
PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 18–19 (Oct. 1955), https://bit.ly/2RKPpO5; see
also Marcus, supra note 85, at 445 & n.72. That Note was never adopted. See, e.g.,
Wilson Research Corp. v. Piolite Plastics Corp., 336 F.2d 303, 305 (1st Cir. 1964). But in
any event, whatever “circumstances, occurrences, and events” the Committee anticipated
were minimal. The proposed Note explained that the need for pleading “circumstances,
occurrences, and events” was shown, inter alia, by “the forms appended to the rules,”
ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra, at 18–19, which were
themselves largely conclusory, see infra Section III.B.2. It further said:
The intent and effect of the rules is to permit the claim to be stated in general
terms; the rules are designed to discourage battles over mere form of statement
and to sweep away the needless controversies which the codes permitted that
served . . . to prevent a party from having a trial because of mistakes in
statement.
ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra, at 19. Moreover, it
emphasized that Rule 8(a) “does away with the confusion resulting from the use of ‘facts’
and ‘cause of action’; and requires the pleader to disclose adequate information as the
basis of his claim for relief as distinguished from a bare averment that he wants relief and
is entitled to it.” Id. And indeed, Conley-era courts sometimes drew upon the
“circumstances, occurrences, and events” language—even though the proposed Note was
not adopted—by relying on Federal Practice and Procedure, which concluded that that
language comported with and was implicit in Conley. See, e.g., McGregor v. Indus.
Excess Landfill, Inc., 856 F.2d 39, 42 (6th Cir. 1988); Jacobs v. Diaz, Civil No. 393/82,
1983 WL 952749, at *1 (V.I. Terr. Ct. Jan. 26, 1983); cf. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3
(citing Federal Practice and Procedure’s discussion of the “circumstances, occurrences,
and events” language in analyzing Conley’s “requirement of providing not only ‘fair
notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests” (citation
omitted)).
103. See, e.g., Homer Cummings, The Third Great Adventure, 29 A.B.A. J. 654, 655
(1943); Alexander Holtzoff, Reform of Federal Criminal Procedure, 12 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 119, 123 (1944); George Z. Medalie, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 4 LAW.
GUILD REV., June–July 1944, at 2–3; Arthur T. Vanderbilt, New Rules of Federal
Criminal Procedure, 29 A.B.A. J. 376, 376–77 (1943); Sam. B. Warner & Henry B.
Cabot, Changes in the Administration of Criminal Justice During the Past Fifty Years, 50
HARV. L. REV. 583, 587 & n.5 (1937); Robert I. Broussard, Comment, The Short Form
Indictment: History, Development and Constitutionality, 6 LA. L. REV. 78, 78–79 (1944);
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In the face of such atrocious severity of punishment one might well
expect to find humane judges searching for technicalities merely to
save miserable offenders from penalties which were outrageously
excessive in particular cases. This practice seems not to have been
uncommon. . . .
Unfortunately, however, every such decision became a precedent for
all future cases, even after undue severity had been eliminated from
the penal provisions . . . . For every defendant who had been saved
from paying the death penalty for some trivial offense by legalistic
acumen, there remained an additional word, clause or phrase which
all future indictments for such offenses would have to contain. More
and more such pleadings became complicated and formidable. These
fossilized relics of the age of punitive savagery were brought over to
this country.104

Frustrations with common law criminal pleading—also like on the
civil side—led to reform efforts.105 Consequently, during the nineteenth
century, “many states began statutory reforms to relax certain commonlaw pleading requirements.”106 As part of that movement, several
jurisdictions adopted code pleading rules to govern indictments. They
required, for example, that an indictment contain “[a] statement of the
facts constituting the offense, in plain and concise language without
unnecessary repetition.”107
Those rules, however, also raised concerns. For example,
commentators noted that they “usually failed to accomplish their
purpose, because they did not purport to change the underlying function
of the indictment and did not suggest the exact wording to be used in
certain cases,” meaning that “lawyers preferred to use language which
had been held sufficient for the particular purpose, however verbose and
archaic, rather than to venture the use of a new and untested terminology
in a very formal instrument.”108 Others suggested that there was little

Imwinkelried, supra note 41, at 355. For a concrete example of common law pleading
(that demonstrates its excesses well), see infra Section IV.C.2.
104. Rollin M. Perkins, Short Indictments and Informations, 15 A.B.A. J. 292, 292
(1929).
105. See, e.g., Meyn, supra note 15, at 702–03, 706.
106. State v. Hunt, 582 S.E.2d 593, 600 (N.C. 2003). Many of these reforms
occurred in the mid-1800s. See id.; see also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, § 19.1(b).
There were, however, earlier reforms. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Peas, 43 Va. (2 Gratt.)
629, 637 (1834); Kane v. People, 8 Wend. 203, 218 (N.Y. 1831).
107. State v. Patten, 64 N.E. 850, 851 (Ind. 1902) (citation omitted); accord, e.g.,
Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 308–09 (1900); Grattan v. State, 71 Ala. 344,
345–46 (1882); In re Mansfield, 39 P. 775, 777–78 (Cal. 1895); Madden v. State, 1 Kan.
340, 348–49 (1863); State v. Hinckley, 4 Minn. 345, 357–58 (1860); People v. Laurence,
33 N.E. 547, 521 (N.Y. 1893); State v. Wright, 37 P. 313, 314 (Wash. 1894).
108. Perkins, supra note 104, at 293.
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difference between code and common law pleading109—and indeed, the
code pleading rules were linguistically similar to common law
requirements.110
Some reforms went further, however, and permitted so-called
“short-form” indictments.111 Such indictments were to include “an
extremely truncated description of the criminal conduct” and then be
supplemented by a bill of particulars or the like.112 For instance, the
American Law Institute in 1930 proposed a short-form indictment rule
that allowed charging “[b]y using the name given to the offense by the
common law or by a statute,” such as alleging just “murder” without
stating any specific acts or even the generalized elements of the
offense;113 and that proposal was adopted by several states.114 Overall,
“[a]t one time, more than a dozen states had authorized some form of
short-form pleading.”115
Nevertheless, before the Federal Rules, the common law pleading
system largely prevailed in the federal courts.116 Despite some federal
109. See, e.g., 2 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OR NEW
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PLEADING AND EVIDENCE AND THE PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL
CASES § 426 (4th ed. 1896); Charles A. Willard, The Seventeenth Century Indictment in
the Light of Modern Conditions, 24 HARV. L. REV. 290, 293, 295 (1911).
110. See, e.g., Floren v. United States, 186 F. 961, 962 (8th Cir. 1911); United
States v. Burns, 54 F. 351, 361 (C.C.D.W. Va. 1893); Locke v. State, 3 Ga. 534, 538
(1847); People v. Gates, 13 Wend. 311, 317 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835); Scroter v. Harrington,
8 N.C. (1 Hawks) 192, 193 (1820); Fouts v. State, 8 Ohio St. 98, 113 (Ohio 1857);
Lamberton v. State, 11 Ohio 282, 284 (1842); Hardy v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. (17
Gratt.) 592, 595 (1867); 1 JOSEPH CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL
LAW, WITH COMPREHENSIVE NOTES ON EACH PARTICULAR OFFENCE, THE PROCESS,
INDICTMENT, PLEA, DEFENCE, EVIDENCE, TRIAL, VERDICT, JUDGMENT, AND PUNISHMENT
168 (5th ed. 1847).
111. See, e.g., LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, § 19.1(c); Warner & Cabot, supra
note 103, at 588.
112. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, § 19.1(c); see also, e.g., Butler v. State, 129
S.W.2d 226, 227 (Ark. 1939); People v. Curtis, 98 P.2d 228, 233 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1939); State v. Engler, 251 N.W. 88, 92 (Iowa 1933); State v. Van Zelfden, 152 So. 554,
556 (La. 1933); Commonwealth v. Farmer, 106 N.E. 150, 151 (Mass. 1914); People v.
Tenerowicz, 253 N.W. 296, 301 (Mich. 1934); People v. Bogdanoff, 171 N.E. 890, 893
(N.Y. 1930); State v. Domanski, 190 A. 854, 857 (R.I. 1937); State v. Solomon, 71 P.2d
104, 105–07 (Utah 1937).
113. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 152–54 (Am. Law Inst. 1930).
114. See Notes and Legislation, Streamlining the Indictment, 53 HARV. L. REV. 122,
123–24 (1939).
115. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, § 19.1(c).
116. See, e.g., ROBERT M. HUGHES, HANDBOOK OF JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE IN
UNITED STATES COURTS 34 (1904); MARK S. RHODES, ORFIELD’S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES §§ 1:4, 7:22 (2019); Lester B. Orfield, The Preliminary Draft
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 22 TEX. L. REV. 37, 51 (1943); Cummings,
supra note 103, at 655; Holtzoff, supra note 103, at 124; Medalie, supra note 103, at 3;
Willard, supra note 109, at 293; Vanderbilt, supra note 103, at 377; see also James M.
Shellow & Susan W. Brenner, Speaking Motions: Recognition of Summary Judgment in
Federal Criminal Procedure, 107 F.R.D. 139, 150, 157 (1985).
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efforts at reform that tempered the common law’s extremes,117 it was
widely perceived that common law technicality governed. Commentators
noted, for example, that “archaic, prolix, and technical
accusations . . . are still used in the federal courts and . . . often give rise
to the interpretation of technicalities and the writing of briefs and the
preparation of arguments over points that have no bearing on the merits
of the case.”118
Change, however, was on the horizon. Around the time of the
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “there were many
who believed that the various criminal rules in use in the District Courts
should be made uniform as well.”119 And “[c]onsistent with the
conclusions of civil reformers, proponents of criminal procedure reform
thought the judiciary best suited to create rules of procedure.”120
Ultimately, like with the Civil Rules, “Congress passed legislation that
gave the Supreme Court authority to draft rules of criminal
procedure,”121 and the Court “appointed an Advisory Committee . . . to
assist it in its undertaking.”122 The Supreme Court adopted the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1944, and they went into effect in
1946.123
iii. The Relationship Between Civil & Criminal
Pleading Requirements
Another aspect of American pleading history important for our
purposes is that, before the Federal Rules, there existed a wellestablished relationship between civil and criminal pleading standards.
117. In 1872, Congress passed a statute stating that “no indictment . . . shall be
deemed insufficient, nor shall the trial, judgment, or other proceeding thereon be affected
by reason of any defect or imperfection in matter of form only, which shall not tend to the
prejudice of the defendant.” Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 762 (1962) (citation
omitted). The Supreme Court regarded that statute as supporting the view that “[t]he rigor
of old common-law rules of criminal pleading has yielded, in modern practice, to the
general principle that formal defects, not prejudicial, will be disregarded.” Hagner v.
United States, 285 U.S. 427, 431 (1932); see also STANLEY F. BREWSTER, FEDERAL
PROCEDURE § 1024 (1940); HUGHES, supra note 116, at 37.
118. Orfield, supra note 116, at 51; accord, e.g., THEODORE W. HOUSEL & GUY O.
WALSER, DEFENDING AND PROSECUTING FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES § 248 (1938);
Cummings, supra note 103, at 655; Holtzoff, supra note 103, at 124; Medalie, supra note
103, at 3; Vanderbilt, supra note 103, at 377.
119. Preface to 1 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 63, at xi; accord Meyn, supra
note 15, at 706–07; see also Holtzoff, supra note 103, at 122 (explaining that federal
criminal procedure had become “a tangled web of numerous heterogeneous strands,”
drawing on “Acts of Congress,” common law, state law “as it existed on the date of the
admission of the state into the Union,” and “current state law”).
120. Meyn, supra note 15, at 707.
121. Id.
122. Preface to 1 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 63, at xi.
123. See FED. R. CRIM. P. historical note.
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Nineteenth and early-twentieth-century state and federal courts
repeatedly emphasized that the rules governing criminal pleadings were
at least as strict as those applicable to civil pleadings, and—putting aside
short-form indictments—they did so regardless of pleading regime.
One common refrain was that criminal and civil pleading rules were
equivalent. For example, in 1843, the Circuit Court for the District of
Ohio explained that “[t]he rules of pleading are the same in civil as in
criminal actions.”124 And in 1902, the Supreme Court of Indiana said that
its code pleading indictment rule uses “precisely the language” as the
rule “which declares the requisite of a complaint in a civil action” and
that “[t]he whole purpose of the legislature, in the enactment of both the
Civil and Criminal Code, was to do away with useless forms, repetition,
and technicality, and thus bring the procedure in both classes of action to
the ‘common understanding.’”125 Similar examples abound.126
In addition, many decisions made clear that criminal pleading
standards should be considered at least as stringent as, or more stringent
than, their civil counterparts. For instance, the Circuit Court for the
District of Michigan said, in 1853, “[omitting a particular type of
allegation] would not answer in an action for civil damages, much less
124. United States v. Brown, 24 F. Cas. 1265, 1265 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No.
14,666).
125. State v. Patten, 64 N.E. 850, 851 (Ind. 1902) (citation omitted).
126. See, e.g., Webb v. York, 79 F. 616, 621 (8th Cir. 1897); Ware v. State, 225
S.W. 626, 631 (Ark. 1920); State v. Hand, 6 Ark. 165, 167 (1845); People v. King, 27
Cal. 507, 510 (1865); Werner v. State, 51 Ga. 426, 427–28 (1874); Ex parte McLeod, 128
P. 1106, 1108 (Idaho 1913); Hunt v. State, 159 N.E. 149, 150 (Ind. 1927); Brunaugh v.
State, 90 N.E. 1019, 1028 (Ind. 1910); State v. Stringfellow, 52 So. 1002, 1004 (La.
1910); State v. Bartley, 43 A. 19, 20 (Me. 1899); State v. Keen, 34 Me. 500, 503 (1852);
Commonwealth v. Child, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 198, 202 (1832); Enders v. People, 20
Mich. 233, 240 (1870); State v. Hinckley, 4 Minn. 345, 357–58 (1860); State v. Hayward,
83 Mo. 299, 305, 312–13 (1884); State v. Ames, 1 Mo. 524, 525 (1825); State v. Hliboka,
78 P. 965, 967 (Mont. 1904); Territory v. Duncan, 6 P. 353, 355–56 (Mont. 1885);
People v. Willis, 53 N.E. 29, 30 (N.Y. 1899); People v. Danahy, 18 N.Y.S. 467, 468
(N.Y. Gen. Term 1892); State v. Whedbee, 67 S.E. 60, 62 (N.C. 1910); Palamarchuk v.
State, 221 P. 120, 121 (Okla. Crim. App. 1923); Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 3 Pen. &
W. 142, 144–45 (Pa. 1831); State v. Crank, 18 S.C.L. (2 Bail.) 66, 69 (S.C. Ct. App.
1831); State v. Ryan, 15 S.C.L. (4 McCord) 16, 16 (S.C. Ct. App. 1826); State v.
Hodgson, 28 A. 1089, 1093–94 (Vt. 1894); Hardy v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. (17 Gratt.)
592, 608 (1867) (Rives, J., dissenting); accord, e.g., JOSEPH HENRY BEALE, JR., A
TREATISE ON CRIMINAL PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 93 (1899); FRANKLIN FISKE HEARD,
HEARD ON THE CRIMINAL LAW: A TREATISE ADAPTED TO THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE
SUPERIOR AND INFERIOR COURTS IN CRIMINAL CASES 101 (2d ed. 1882); HOWARD C.
JOYCE & ARTHUR W. BLAKEMORE, TREATISE ON THE LAW GOVERNING INDICTMENTS WITH
FORMS §§ 276, 291, 295 (2d ed. 1924); THOMAS W. POWELL, ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN
LAW 637 (1870); FRANK S. RICE, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN
THEIR APPLICATION TO THE TRIAL OF CRIMINAL CASES AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER THE
CRIMINAL CODES OF THE SEVERAL STATES § 120 (1893); William Chenault, Criminal
Pleading, 1 KY. L.J. 53, 53 (1881); 1 CHITTY, supra note 110, at 168, 172; Meyn, supra
note 15, at 701–02.
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then, in an indictment, which should be specially descriptive of the
offense charged.”127 Similarly, a 1902 Missouri appeals court declared
that “immemorial law” provided that “greater strictness of averment is
required in criminal than in civil pleadings.”128 Likewise, in 1877, the
Supreme Court of Alabama asserted that, although it was often said “that
the rules of pleading are the same in criminal cases as in civil,” “the
practice is to require greater strictness in criminal matters than in civil”
and so, “in the absence of statutory regulations, as high a degree of
certainty is required in criminal pleadings as in civil.”129 And in 1871, the
Supreme Court of Indiana observed that, under its code pleading regime,
“[t]he rule of [criminal and civil] pleading is the same,” but “[i]f there
was or should be any difference, it should be in favor of greater certainty
and particularity in the criminal, than in the civil cases.”130 Finally, also
in 1871, the Supreme Court of Oregon illustrated the minimum an
indictment should include under its code pleading rule by noting, “In our
practice in civil cases, a pleading is insufficient and subject to demurrer
if the pleader alleges conclusions of law instead of the facts from which
such conclusions may be deduced.”131 Again, there are numerous similar
examples.132
127. United States v. Schuler, 27 F. Cas. 978, 979 (C.C.D. Mich. 1853) (No.
16,234).
128. Munchow v. Munchow, 70 S.W. 386, 387 (Mo. Ct. App. 1902).
129. Noble v. State, 59 Ala. 73, 77–78 (1877) (citations omitted).
130. Quinn v. State, 35 Ind. 485, 487 (1871).
131. State v. Dougherty, 4 Or. 200, 202–03 (1871).
132. See, e.g., Friedenstein v. United States, 125 U.S. 224, 238 (1888) (Field, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Hunter, 80 F.2d 968, 970 (5th Cir. 1936); Beck v. United
States, 33 F.2d 107, 110 (8th Cir. 1929); United States v. Hous. Belt & Terminal Ry. Co.,
205 F. 344, 348 (5th Cir. 1913); United States v. Korner, 56 F. Supp. 242, 250 (S.D. Cal.
1944); United States v. Sugar Inst., 51 F.2d 1066, 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Co., 234 F. 127, 136 (E.D. Mo. 1916); United States v. Martindale,
146 F. 289, 293–94 (D. Kan. 1904); United States v. Reid, 73 F. 289, 290 (W.D. Mich.
1896); United States v. Potter, 56 F. 97, 102 (C.C.D. Mass. 1892); United States v. Fisler,
25 F. Cas. 1091, 1091 (D. Ind. 1865) (No. 15,105); Seals v. State, 194 So. 682, 684 (Ala.
1939); People v. Cohen, 50 P. 20, 21 (Cal. 1897); People v. Wakao, 165 P. 720, 721–22
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1917); Burnham v. State, 20 So. 548, 549 (Fla. 1896); Hoyt v. State,
50 Ga. 313, 323 (1873); Locke v. State, 3 Ga. 534, 538 (1847); People v. Berman, 147
N.E. 428, 430 (Ill. 1925); Haughn v. State, 65 N.E. 287, 288–89 (Ind. 1902); Bloom v.
Franklin Life Ins. Co., 97 Ind. 478, 479–80 (1884); State v. Nutwell, 1 Gill 54, 56 (Md.
1843); People v. Maki, 223 N.W. 70, 74–75 (Mich. 1929); People v. Petheran, 31 N.W.
188, 196 (Mich. 1887) (Campbell, C.J., dissenting); State v. Patterson, 59 S.W. 1104,
1105 (Mo. 1900); State v. Mayfield, 66 Mo. 125, 126 (1877); City of Louisiana v.
Anderson, 73 S.W. 875, 876 (Mo. Ct. App. 1903); State ex rel. Baldwin v. Kellogg, 36 P.
957, 961–62 (Mont. 1894); People v. Logan, 1 Nev. 110, 116 (1865); Manley v. People,
7 N.Y. 295, 304 (1852) (Edmonds, J., concurring); Latham v. Westervelt, 26 Barb. 256,
260 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1857); Kain v. State, 8 Ohio St. 306, 317–18 (Ohio 1858); State v.
Scarth, 3 P.2d 446, 450 (Okla. 1931); Smith v. Nat’l Sur. Co., 149 P. 1040, 1040–41 (Or.
1915); State v. Coleman, 8 S.C. 237, 242 (1876); Patrick v. Smoke, 34 S.C.L. (3 Strob.)
147, 153–54 (S.C. Ct. App. 1848); Commonwealth v. Peas, 43 Va. (2 Gratt.) 629, 631–32
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In short, before the Federal Rules, criminal pleadings were regularly
viewed as subject to as much scrutiny as, or more scrutiny than, civil
pleadings.
c. The Original Advisory Committee Note to Rule 7(c)
The third source is Rule 7(c)’s original Advisory Committee Note.
That Note is important, first, because it explicitly references Rule 8(a). It
says: “This rule introduces a simple form of indictment, illustrated by
Forms 1 to 11 in the Appendix of Forms. Cf. Rule 8(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.”133 In other words, it suggests a relationship
between Rule 7(c) and Rule 8(a).
That relationship, moreover, is apparently one of analogy. At the
time the Note was adopted, the “cf.” signal directed readers to “where
contrasted, analogous, or explanatory views or statements may be
found.”134 And nothing indicates that the cross-reference to Rule 8(a)
was meant to direct readers to contrasting or explanatory material.
Furthermore, a separate portion of the Note—referring to a different
provision of Rule 7(c)—contains a nearly indistinguishable “cf.” crossreference to Rule 8:
The provision . . . that it may be alleged in a single count that the
means by which the defendant committed the offense are unknown,
or that he committed it by one or more specified means, is intended
to eliminate the use of multiple counts for the purpose of alleging the
commission of the offense by different means or in different ways.
Cf. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8(e)(2).135

That second cross-reference, relating to Rule 8(e)(2), was plainly meant
to convey analogy because when the Advisory Committee Note was
written, Rule 8(e)(2) permitted exactly what the Note says the referenced
portion of Rule 7(c) was designed to accomplish: Rule 8(e)(2) allowed
parties to “set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense
alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in
separate counts or defenses.”136 There is no reason to think the crossreference to Rule 8(a), which, again, is essentially identical to the cross-

(1834); Selvey v. Grafton Coal & Coke Co., 79 S.E. 656, 657 (W. Va. 1913); accord,
e.g., United States v. Hanna, 7 C.M.R. 571, 578 (A.F.B.R. 1952); 11 CYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW 129 (Charles E. Chadman ed., 1906); JAMES GOULD & ARTHUR P. WILL, A TREATISE
ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING 1 n.b (6th ed. 1909); 1 BISHOP, supra note 109, §§ 320–
21.
133. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c) 1944 advisory committee’s note.
134. CF., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933) (emphasis added).
135. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c) 1944 advisory committee’s note.
136. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e)(2) (1938) (emphasis added).
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reference to Rule 8(e)(2) and appears nearby in the same Note, was
intended to convey something different.
The Advisory Committee Note is also significant because of the
following sentence, which appears directly after the cross-reference to
Rule 8(a):
For discussion of the effect of this rule and a comparison between the
present form of indictment and the simple form introduced by this
rule, see Vanderbilt, 29 A.B.A.Jour. 376, 377; Homer Cummings, 29
A.B.A.Jour. 654, 655; Holtzoff, 3 F.R.D. 445, 448–449; Holtzoff, 12
Geo.Washington L.R. 119, 123–126; Medalie, 4 Lawyers Guild R.
(3) 1, 3.137

In that sentence, several articles are cited to depict what Rule 7(c) was
meant to achieve, and all but one were written by members of the
Advisory Committee that drafted the Criminal Rules.138 What those
articles make clear is that the Committee wanted to simplify criminal
pleadings from the technical and intricate common law form, but not at
all costs. Instead, the drafters wanted to balance simplifying procedures
and protecting defendants’ rights, and they even sought to strengthen
defendants’ rights where possible.139 Indeed, one reason why they
wanted to simplify pleadings was to protect defendants by ensuring they
could better understand the allegations against them than they could
under common law pleading.140 And in order to avoid the delay caused
137. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c) 1944 advisory committee’s note.
138. See New Rules on Criminal Procedure in the Federal Courts, 15 N.Y. ST. B.A.
BULL. 175, 175–76 (1943). The exception is the article by Homer Cummings.
Additionally, the two articles by Alexander Holtzoff are functionally the same for our
purposes, compare Holtzoff, supra note 103, with Alexander Holtzoff, Reform of
Criminal Procedure, 3 F.R.D. 445 (1944), so I have only cited to one of them (the article
in the George Washington Law Review).
139. See Cummings, supra note 103, at 654–55 (“While concerning ourselves with
efficiency and expedition great care must be taken to avoid the impairment of any of the
just rights of the accused. . . . At all times [the drafters] have been sedulous in preserving
the rights of the accused.”); Holtzoff, supra note 103, at 123 (“The simplification of
procedure has been accomplished . . . without sacrifice of any safeguards that properly
surround a defendant in a criminal case. In fact, in some respects the new rules have
cemented and strengthened the protection accorded to the defendant.”); Medalie, supra
note 103, at 2 (“The rules therefore must be drawn to safeguard the innocent, to facilitate
the prosecution and speedy conviction of the guilty, without sacrificing fundamental
principles of justice and fair play.”); Vanderbilt, supra note 103, at 376–77 (“In drafting
the rules, the committee has been guided by two basic principles. First, its purpose has
been to provide a simple procedure devoid of technicalities . . . . The second
principle . . . was the necessity of preserving unimpaired and of strengthening where
essential and desirable those rights of a defendant which are regarded as basic in the
Anglo-American conception of criminal justice.”).
140. See Cummings, supra note 103, at 655 (“[The simplified indictment] is a great
improvement upon the ancient form which could serve only to bewilder an accused and
impel his counsel to reach for a microscope to discern some possible defect in so lengthy
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by motions for bills of particulars, the drafters decided against permitting
“short-form” indictments.141

and dismal a document.”); Holtzoff, supra note 103, at 124 (“Actually, instead of
apprizing the defendant of the crime of which he is accused, [the type of indictment Rule
7(c) repudiated] tends to mystify him.”); Medalie, supra note 103, at 3 (“The need to
guard against microscopic technical flaws [under the old pleading rules] had resulted in a
plethora of logomachy in which lurked, well hidden, the substance of the offense. . . . It is
hoped that this new rule will lead to the swift abolition of the lengthy, wordy and obscure
indictments which obfuscated, rather than stated, the facts constituting the crime.”).
141. See Holtzoff, supra note 103, at 125–26 (“The form adopted by the Committee
is not what is technically known as the short form indictment, which merely names the
crime with which the defendant is charged, by its legal term, without specifying or
summarizing the facts of the offense. The Committee deliberately rejected indictments of
this type, because they are apt to evoke motions for bills of particulars and thereby
constitute a source of unnecessary delay.”); Vanderbilt, supra note 103, at 377 (“A
simple form of indictment is proposed which constitutes a compromise between the
present prolix document and the extremely short form. The objection to the latter is that it
almost invariably evokes a motion for a bill of particulars and thereby is productive of
delay.”).
Several contemporary articles written by the drafters but not cited in the Advisory
Committee Note are in accord with the foregoing points about the articles referenced in
the Note. See, e.g., George H. Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:
II, 56 YALE L.J. 197, 205–06 (1947); Alexander Holtzoff, The New Federal Criminal
Procedure, 37 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 111, 114–15 (1946); Lester B. Orfield, The
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 21 N.Y.U. L.Q. Rev. 167, 175 (1948); Lester B.
Orfield, The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 26 NEB. L. REV. 570, 580 (1947);
Orfield, supra note 116, at 50–51; cf. George H. Dession, The New Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure: I, 55 YALE L.J. 694, 696 (1946) (“Most of the articles by
Committee members were written while the enterprise was still in progress, and reflect
the policy considerations which moved the Committee.”). And around the time of the
Criminal Rules’ promulgation, multiple drafters commented that Rule 7(c) was of limited
effect, further suggesting that they did not seek to simplify pleadings at all costs. George
Dession, for example, said:
Simple and non-technical pleadings are contemplated, as illustrated in the
Appendix of Forms prepared by the Advisory Committee. But since such
pleadings were entirely sufficient before the adoption of the Rule, it may be
assumed that prolixity up to a point will continue to be tolerated and that the
Rule will not end the flow of republication by commercial annotators of trial
court rulings on procedural points which have little significance beyond the
particular case and serve chiefly to augment the work of law clerks and the
costs of litigation.
Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: II, supra, at 205–06. Likewise,
Arthur Vanderbilt explained that an indictment “could always be” “a plain, concise and
definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged” and that
he did not “know whether we can succeed except by moral suasion in getting the
indictment to be concise and definite instead of prolix, verbose and involved.”
Proceedings of the Institute on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Feb. 1946), in 6
N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE WITH NOTES AND
INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 157 (Alexander Holtzoff ed., 1946).
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d. The Drafting History of the Criminal Rules
The final source is the drafting history of the Criminal Rules. That
history reveals six critical points that are crucial to understanding Rule
7(c)’s original design.
The first is that the Criminal Rules were initially based on and tied
to the Civil Rules, but the drafters ultimately severed any connection
between those sets of Rules.
When the Reporter to the Advisory Committee, James Robinson,
prepared his first draft of the Criminal Rules, he based that draft on the
Civil Rules and sought to directly link the Civil and Criminal Rules.142
He emphasized, for instance, that the draft “follow[ed] as closely as
possible in organization, in numbering and in substance the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.”143 He further explained that the draft was
“prepared with the idea of carrying that parallelism as far as possible”
and that adhering to the organization and content of the Civil Rules was
“a fundamental principle.”144 And the first draft even included a
“Conformity Rule,” which stated, “The procedure under these rules is
designed to conform as closely as possible to the procedure under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and these rules shall be construed with
that purpose in view.”145
The Committee, however, quickly rejected the idea to align the
Criminal and Civil Rules.146 For instance, several Committee members
expressed that they found the concept questionable because they viewed
the criminal and civil contexts as markedly different with respect to “the
dominant policies,” “the problems,” and “the work” in litigating cases.147
And as a result of the discussion on this subject, the drafters voted
unanimously to strike the Conformity Rule.148
Even after that, moreover, the drafters continued to emphasize that
civil and criminal procedure should be kept separate. For example, in

142. See Meyn, supra note 15, at 710, 713–14.
143. Hearing Before the Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure, U.S.
COURTS 5 (Sept. 1941) [hereinafter September 1941 Hearing], https://bit.ly/3nAsfWv. I
generally describe Advisory Committee meetings as “hearings.” That term is drawn from
the cover page of the initial transcript document for the Advisory Committee on Criminal
Rules, and I use it for consistency throughout. The “hearings” I refer to, however, were
not hearings in the sense of inviting outside participation in the discussion. Rather, they
were simply meetings of the relevant Committees.
144. Id. at 4, 6.
145. FED. R. CRIM. P. 2 (Tentative Draft No. 1, Sept. 1941), microformed on
Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference, Committees on Rules of Practice and
Procedures, 1935-1988--Committee on Criminal Procedure (Cong. Info. Serv.); Meyn,
supra note 15, at 713 (citation omitted).
146. See Meyn, supra note 15, at 714.
147. September 1941 Hearing, supra note 143, at 18, 21–22.
148. See id. at 23.
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debating whether Civil Rule 11 should apply in criminal cases,
Committee members said:
Mr. Dean. It points out the basic difficulties when we try to relate
civil with criminal. We may have the same situation later on when
someone tries to compare the civil and criminal, and actually they
should not be compared.
Mr. Wechsler. I think any general student of the subject would be as
surprised as I am to see the civil rules adopted as a model for the
system of criminal procedure.
Mr. Dession. Yes; I think our duty is to find out what are the
problems in the criminal law and to draw a code for them, and to pay
no attention to what is in the civil code.149

The second critical point is that civil and criminal pleading reforms
played a foundational role in the development of Rule 7(c) and its
“essential facts” language. The Advisory Committee repeatedly invoked
Civil Rule 8(a) in designing Rule 7(c), and it expressly amended and
crafted Rule 7(c) to be more like its civil counterpart. The Committee
also drew heavily on civil and criminal code pleading rules in creating
Rule 7(c), and it viewed those rules as equivalent to each other and its
reliance on them as in complete harmony with its invocation of Rule
8(a).
Although Robinson’s first draft of the Criminal Rules broadly
followed the Civil Rules, the first draft of Rule 7(c) was designed to be
more exacting than Rule 8(a).150 It set out ten specifications regarding
what a criminal pleading had to contain, including “a plain and concise
statement of”: (1) “the court’s jurisdiction”; (2) the pleading’s source; (3)
the defendant’s name; (4) when the offense occurred; (5) the location of
the offense; (6) “the act or acts or the omission of legal duty” involved;
(7) “the criminal intent”; (8) the name of anyone injured; (9) “any other
fact or allegation which may be necessary because of special
requirements . . . for notice to the defendant and to the court of the act
and offense of which the defendant is accused”; and (10) “the statute” at
issue.151
149. Id. at 367.
150. See Meyn, supra note 15, at 715–16. Robinson regarded pleading as “one
place where the civil rules and the criminal rules are different” because, in his view,
criminal pleading involved “stating the grounds for putting a man in the penitentiary” and
“[t]here is nothing comparable to that in the civil rules.” September 1941 Hearing, supra
note 143, at 218; see also Meyn, supra note 15, at 716.
151. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8 (Tentative Draft No. 1, Sept. 1941), microformed on
Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference, Committees on Rules of Practice and
Procedures, 1935-1988--Committee on Criminal Procedure (Cong. Info. Serv.); see also
Meyn, supra note 15, at 716 n.115.
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Discussion of that Rule began with Committee member Frederick
Crane. Crane believed that the Rule’s ten specifications might be too
much and argued that they should be replaced with simpler language: “a
brief statement of facts constituting the crime.”152
The Committee recognized that Crane’s proposed language was
similar to criminal code pleading statutes, so those statutes set the initial
focus of the debate. George Medalie, for instance, said, “Judge Crane,
you have in mind . . . the latest provision of the New York Code of
Criminal Procedure with respect to the simplified indictment.”153 And
Alexander Holtzoff suggested that Crane’s idea was to adopt a type of
simplified indictment that had been used under the New York criminal
code pleading provision Medalie had cited.154
Soon, however, the drafters started to invoke civil code pleading
practices, interchangeably with criminal ones, as informing Crane’s
language and the proper criminal pleading standard. For instance, after
Crane clarified that his proposal did not mean that indictments actually
needed to be short, Medalie responded with a discussion of civil code
pleading:
You have the same situation as in modern equity pleading. In our
code states it is provided for the complaint giving a simple and
concise statement of the facts constituting the right to [relief]. That is
all that is necessary. Some lawyers do it, but they are scared to death
when they do it.
To this day, notwithstanding the simple code of pleading, the average
complaint calling for equitable [relief] in any pleaded state of facts is
a virtual pamphlet.155

He then directly tied civil and criminal code pleading together and
treated them as supplying the appropriate pleading standard for the
Criminal Rules in line with Crane’s proposal, saying, “if you just have a
rule such as you have in the civil practice acts and codes of criminal
procedure where simple, nontechnical forms of pleading are provided for

152. September 1941 Hearing, supra note 143, at 198–99.
153. Id. at 200. Crane rejected Medalie’s comparison to New York law, which, in
Crane’s view, did not require a statement of the facts. See id. at 199–200. That
disagreement, however, was the result of a simple misunderstanding. In 1881, New York
had adopted a pleading requirement like Crane’s. See People v. Iannone, 384 N.E.2d 656,
661 (N.Y. 1978); see also Charles B. Nutting, The Indictment in New York, 19 CORNELL
L.Q. 580, 586–87 (1934). In 1929, however, it enacted a short-form indictment rule. See
Iannone, 384 N.E.2d at 661; Nutting, supra, at 587. Nevertheless, indictments under the
1881 law remained proper. See Iannone, 384 N.E.2d at 661; Nutting, supra, at 587. Thus,
Medalie was referring to the 1881 law, and Crane was rejecting the 1929 one.
154. See September 1941 Hearing, supra note 143, at 200–02.
155. Id. at 206.
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by saying, ‘a concise statement of facts constituting the offense,’ that is
sufficient.”156
Immediately after that, and without any suggestion of perceived
inconsistency with Medalie’s invocation of code pleading, the
Committee contemplated establishing a Rule based on Rule 8(a)
incorporating Crane’s proffered language:
Mr. Holtzoff. Right there, Mr. Medalie, let me say that the civil rules,
under Rule 8-A, requires a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. We could adopt that
language and require a short and plain statement of facts constituting
the offense with which the defendant is charged.
Mr. Crane. Say “a concise statement of facts.”
Mr. Youngquist. I like the word “plain” because it eliminates these
technical forms.
Mr. Crane. You want to state that he is charged with the crime first,
and then you state the facts.
Mr. Holtzoff. Yes.
The Chairman [Vanderbilt]. May this be a fair solution of the
problem, to adopt the language of the corresponding section of the
civil rules for this purpose and then in a note indicate what would be
some of the different elements that would be specified.157

Ultimately, Arthur Vanderbilt—serving as Chairman—asked if the
Committee was “generally agreed that it is sufficient . . . to provide a
paraphrase corresponding to the civil rules?”158 But that led to a debate
over whether to adopt a Rule similar to Rule 8(a) or something more
stringent, in line with the original first draft of Rule 7(c).159 As
Vanderbilt put it: “There seem to be two schools of thought . . . . One
seems to be content with a mere statement of facts, and the other wants
something longer.”160 For example, Holtzoff and Robinson argued the
issue as follows:
Mr. Holtzoff. You have civil rules which have been in effect for three
years, and they have worked out very well.
Mr. Robinson. Here is one place where the civil rules and the
criminal rules are different. You are stating the grounds for putting a

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id. at 207.
Id. at 209.
See id. at 209–10, 214, 218–19.
Id. at 214.
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man in the penitentiary. There is nothing comparable to that in the
civil rules.
Mr. Holtzoff. I think that if you have a statement of the facts that is
all that any defendant is entitled to.161

Vanderbilt eventually sought to bring the issue to a close for the day—
and further emphasized that the Committee was between embracing a
pleading requirement based on Rule 8(a) or something more
demanding—by asking:
The Chairman [Vanderbilt]. Haven’t we pressed this issue about as
much as we can? The issue is pretty clear: either to have the rule
stated in substantially the same form as it is now or alternatively to
have it made in paraphrase with the civil rules corresponding to it
with an accompanying annotation by the reporter giving it substance
plus some specimen forms in an appendix?
Mr. Medalie suggests that we do not have a vote on it, but should not
we think about this issue and perhaps see a revised form of the rule in
a form suggested by Judge Crane, and then tomorrow proceed to
come to a tentative decision on it?162

Nevertheless, a discussion followed in which Holtzoff again suggested
that “[i]f you take the civil rules, you can say ‘plain and specific
statement of the facts constituting the offense with which the defendant
is charged’, then paraphrase the civil rule.”163
The Committee reconvened the next day, and when the pleading
Rule came up again, the focus shifted fluidly back to criminal code
pleading.164 Vanderbilt raised the issue and asked whether the Committee
was ready for a tentative vote.165 Then, Medalie again noted that New
York’s criminal code pleading provision contained language similar to
Crane’s.166 Vanderbilt eventually called for a vote on whether to
tentatively adopt “[t]his form presented by the reporter or the short

161. Id. at 218.
162. Id. at 219. Vanderbilt had unsuccessfully called for a decision earlier. See id. at
214.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 220.
See September 1941 Hearing, supra note 143, at 335.
See id.
See id. at 335–36.
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form167 advocated by Judge Crane and just quoted by Mr. Medalie.”168
The Committee unanimously voted for Crane’s version.169
Later discussions of the Rule, moreover, returned to civil code
pleading. During review by the Subcommittee on Style, several Advisory
Committee members suggested that an indictment might simply include
a statement of facts and lead to convictions for whatever crimes those
facts supported.170 Herbert Wechsler then clarified that he thought that
was the import of the Committee’s chosen pleading language—precisely
because it drew upon civil code pleading. In his words, “I thought [just
setting forth the facts and letting the chips fall where they may fall] was
the purpose of the rule, that is, it followed the civil precedent that goes
back to the earliest codes, that you shall have a plain and concise
statement of the facts.”171
The third critical point from the drafting history essential for
understanding Rule 7(c) is that, although a core aspect of the
Committee’s pleading discussion involved whether to adopt Robinson’s
or Crane’s proposed language, the drafters also repeatedly indicated that
Crane’s language was paraphrasing Robinson’s. As Crane explained
when he initially proposed his phrasing, “You can say ‘a brief statement
of facts constituting the crime’; it covers all these [the ten specifications
from Robinson’s first draft version] and yet leaves some liberality.”172
167. “Short form” here did not mean an indictment merely naming the offense. Cf.
supra notes 111–115 and accompanying text. Rather, it referred to a short rule
repudiating the common law form. The Committee used the term “short form”
inconsistently.
168. September 1941 Hearing, supra note 143, at 337–38.
169. See id. at 338. After the Committee tentatively voted on Crane’s language,
Robinson produced a new draft Rule incorporating that language which largely matched
the final version. See Hearing Before the Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal
Procedure, U.S. COURTS 244 (Jan. 1942) [hereinafter January 1942 Hearing],
http://bit.ly/3rAmMzA (“The written accusation shall be a plain, concise, and definite
statement of the essential facts which constitute the offence charged against the
accused.”). The Committee then voted to approve it in substance. See id. at 244–48.
170. See Minutes of Meetings of Sub-Committee on Style of the Advisory Committee
on Rules of Criminal Procedure 296, 298–99 (Mar.–Apr. 1942), microformed on Records
of the U.S. Judicial Conference, Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedures, 19351988--Committee on Criminal Procedure (Cong. Info. Serv.) [hereinafter March–April
1942 Hearing].
171. Id. at 299. The drafters ultimately adopted at least a version of that approach,
albeit one that offered more protections to defendants than a pure statement of facts. Cf.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c) (1946) (requiring citation of the statute, etc., underlying the charge
but specifying that “[e]rror in the citation or its omission shall not be ground for dismissal
of the indictment or information or for reversal of a conviction if the error or omission
did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice”); March–April 1942 Hearing, supra note
170, at 296, 298–99, 313–34, 350–53 (showing that the development of the “citation”
provision of Rule 7(c) was informed by Wechsler’s (and others’) view on indictments, as
described above).
172. September 1941 Hearing, supra note 143, at 198.
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And after Robinson produced a new draft Rule incorporating Crane’s
language, he described it as reflecting Crane’s idea “to try to state in a
few words what was contained in the former rule, which sought to
catalog or list the essential elements of the offence.”173
The fourth critical point is that the Advisory Committee adopted its
“essential facts” language despite receiving feedback warning of the
problems such language could cause—the problems of code pleading
that Rule 8(a)’s drafters sought to avoid174—and highlighting Rule 8(a)’s
omission of the word “facts.”
During the drafting process, the Committee collected commentary
from the bench and bar on drafts of the Criminal Rules, and it received
numerous responses to its pleading Rule. Those responses included
serious criticisms of the proposed “essential facts” language. For
example, one commentator remarked:
[T]hat first sentence may lead to trouble, to say “The information or
the indictment shall be a plain, concise, and definite written statement
of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.” Now I think
that probably is a good a statement as one could make, but we are
always confronted with the question of whether your reference to
essential facts . . . means essential evidentiary facts or whether that
means essential ultimate facts, and you will have cases in which
counsel for the defendants will contend that while perhaps the stated
facts are inferences from facts and those are mixed questions of law
and fact . . . this rule contemplates that the evidentiary facts shall be
stated.175

Another suggested that the Rule be rewritten to omit reference to
“essential facts” because then it would “not call for taking the technical
distinction between evidence, facts and conclusions of law as the [draft
Rule] does, or at least may,” and that commentator further advised the
Committee to “[c]ompare the Federal Civil Rules where in Rule 8(b)

173. January 1942 Hearing, supra note 169, at 244. There were comments to the
contrary. For example, Robinson objected to Crane’s proposal because he believed it
would “simply take [the ninth specification] and make it the rule.” September 1941
Hearing, supra note 143, at 218. And others were opposed to certain of the
specifications. See, e.g., id. at 211 (“Mr. Holtzoff. I am opposed to point 10.”). But the
drafters at least to some degree accepted the idea that Crane’s language captured the
essence of the more stringent first draft of the Rule.
174. See supra notes 93–98 and accompanying text; infra Section III.B.2.
175. Comments, Recommendations and Suggestions Concerning the Preliminary
Draft of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, in 2 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note
63, at 70.
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[sic] and elsewhere in connection with pleading there is no reference to
pleading ‘facts.’” 176 And a third noted:
[The Rule] reads that the indictment or information shall state “the
essential facts constituting the offense charged.” While some of the
Forms evidence a liberal interpretation of what the charge may be,
the requirement, in the Rule, of the allegation of “facts” touches a
matter that has given trouble, it seems to me, whenever it has been
encountered.177

In short, the Committee was cautioned that its “essential facts”
language might lead to the same problems as code pleading and that Rule
8(a) did not use the word “facts.” Nevertheless, the drafters retained that
language in full.
The fifth critical point is that the Committee considered whether to
allow short-form indictments but decided against doing so. Crane from
the outset rejected the idea, stressing that he “d[id] not like” pleading
requirements under which “you need not state the facts.”178 And Medalie
emphasized early on “that the sentiment is against simply naming the
offense and later giving the particulars.”179 Around the votes on Crane’s
language, moreover, Crane, Robinson, and Medalie all asserted that the
Committee had not approved of short-form indictments.180
Now despite that, one Committee member did argue for short-form
indictments, after Crane’s proposal had been adopted. George Dession
asserted that “if we want to guard against pleadings being dismissed
through an inadvertent error, then I think the extremely short form of
pleading might be worth considering here.”181 Medalie observed,
however, that such an indictment was “of course . . . not covered by our
discussion at all.”182 Additionally, Holtzoff rebuffed Dession, saying, “Of
course, we want to avoid a bill of particulars as much as possible by
having the indictments set forth sufficient [sic] so that bills of particulars
would not be necessary.”183 Dession pushed back, and some members
toyed with allowing short-form indictments.184 But Crane, who was then

176. Comments, Recommendations and Suggestions Concerning the Preliminary
Draft of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, in 3 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note
63, at 368–69.
177. Id. at 369.
178. September 1941 Hearing, supra note 143, at 199.
179. Id. at 207.
180. See id. at 342; January 1942 Hearing, supra note 169, at 243.
181. January 1942 Hearing, supra note 169, at 253.
182. Id. at 255.
183. Id. at 256.
184. See id. at 256–58.

666

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 125:3

serving as Chairman, brought the conversation to a close by observing
that the matter had already been decided.185 No change was adopted.186
The final critical point is that the drafters recognized that setting the
criminal pleading standard was a momentous decision and approached it
carefully. Initial notes of matters to be covered by the Criminal Rules
emphasized the importance of pleading, directing the Committee to:
Substitute a short form187 indictment for the archaic, prolix, technical
forms of indictments that are still used in the Federal courts and that
frequently give rise to the interposition of technicalities and writing
of briefs and the preparation of arguments that have no bearing upon
the merits of the case.188

When Robinson introduced his first draft, moreover, he explained that, as
to pleading, “the recommendations from the bar are quite heavy” and
“we have lots of recommendations of the short form189 of indictment.”190
And as a result, he made clear that serious thought had been put into the
pleading question, saying, at various points: “So the effort has been made
to decide what the answer is to ‘short.’ Just what is your short form191 of
indictment?”; and “I feel we have the responsibility of all these requests
that have been coming in here about the short form192 of indictment.”193
185. See id. at 258.
186. See id. That conclusion is further confirmed by the development of Rule 7(c)’s
Advisory Committee Note. The first draft of that Note stated, “The form of indictment or
information proposed is not the short form, which often requires supplementation by the
dilatory and technically restrictive bill of particulars.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 8 advisory
committee’s note (Tentative Draft No. 5, June 1942), microformed on Records of the
U.S. Judicial Conference, Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedures, 1935-1988-Committee on Criminal Procedure (Cong. Info. Serv.). That language, in substance,
prevailed for multiple drafts before the final version. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c) advisory
committee’s note (Tentative Draft No. 6, Fall 1942), microformed on Records of the U.S.
Judicial Conference, Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedures, 1935-1988-Committee on Criminal Procedure (Cong. Info. Serv.); FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(d) advisory
committee’s note (Preliminary Draft No. 1, Mar. 1943), microformed on Records of the
U.S. Judicial Conference, Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedures, 1935-1988-Committee on Criminal Procedure (Cong. Info. Serv.); FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c) advisory
committee’s note (Preliminary Draft No. 2, Feb. 1944), microformed on Records of the
U.S. Judicial Conference, Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedures, 1935-1988-Committee on Criminal Procedure (Cong. Info. Serv.). And the articles cited in the final
Note confirm that short-form indictments were prohibited. See supra note 141 and
accompanying text.
187. See supra note 167.
188. Notes of Matters to be Covered by Rules of Criminal Procedure 2 (Feb. 1941),
microformed on Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference, Committees on Rules of
Practice and Procedures, 1935-1988--Committee on Criminal Procedure (Cong. Info.
Serv.).
189. See supra note 167.
190. September 1941 Hearing, supra note 143, at 198.
191. See supra note 167.
192. See supra note 167.
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Furthermore, after an extensive debate over pleading requirements,
Vanderbilt called for a vote but Medalie urged restraint.194 He stressed
that the Committee was “dealing with one of the most fundamental
questions that [it was] going to decide here” and that “we should do a lot
of thinking about it,” and his guidance was followed.195 Lastly, Rule
7(c)’s language was ultimately adopted only after multiple votes,196 as
well as considerable debate and deliberation.197
2. How the Sources Demonstrate that Rule 7(c) Was Designed
to Be at Least as Stringent as Rule 8(a)
The foregoing sources, taken together, demonstrate that Rule 7(c)
was designed to be at least as stringent as Rule 8(a).
To start, in crafting Rule 7(c) and adopting its “essential facts”
language, the Advisory Committee repeatedly invoked Rule 8(a) and
used it as a key design template. And it did so in moving away from what
it considered to be a more stringent requirement contained in the first
draft of the Rule—not in moving towards Rule 8(a) from a less stringent
requirement. Furthermore, although the Committee did not just draw on
Rule 8(a), it treated the pleading practices it relied upon as
interchangeable, and it never indicated that those other practices were
less demanding than Rule 8(a).
Additionally, the Committee’s reliance on Rule 8(a) led to a real
and tangible connection between Rule 7(c) and Rule 8(a). Instead of
leaving its references to Rule 8(a) to the hearing room and the pages of a
transcript, the Committee elected to include an explicit cross-reference to
Rule 8(a) in the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 7(c). And the drafters
plainly wanted that cross-reference to signify an analogous relationship
between Rule 7(c) and Rule 8(a)—in line with their understanding of the
Rules during the drafting discussions—given their use of the “cf.” signal
in the cross-reference as well as their utilization of a virtually identical
cross-reference nearby in the same Note to convey analogy between Rule
7(c) and Rule 8.
The decision to associate Rule 7(c) with Rule 8(a), moreover, was
significant and meant to have force. The first draft of the Criminal Rules
was keyed to the Civil Rules, but the drafters eliminated any generalized
relationship between those Rules—repeatedly emphasizing that the
criminal and civil contexts were too dissimilar to be associated. Rule
7(c), however, followed precisely the opposite path. The first draft of
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

September 1941 Hearing, supra note 143, at 198, 341.
See id. at 214.
Id. at 214, 219.
See, e.g., id. at 338; January 1942 Hearing, supra note 169, at 244–48.
See supra notes 150–171 and accompanying text.
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Rule 7(c) was designed to depart from Rule 8(a),198 but it was later—
after the Committee had already severed the relationship between the
Civil and Criminal Rules—specifically redesigned with Rule 8(a) in
mind and linked to Rule 8(a) expressly by way of the cross-reference in
the Advisory Committee Note. In short, the Committee purposefully
bolstered the relationship between Rule 7(c) and Rule 8(a) while
terminating connections between the Civil and Criminal Rules generally.
It is profoundly unlikely that the drafters did that casually or without
intending to have a meaningful impact on the Rule.
What is more, there is strong evidence that the relationship between
Rule 7(c) and Rule 8(a) the drafters anticipated was that Rule 7(c) would
demand more than Rule 8(a). First of all, Rule 8(a) was designed to
repudiate civil code pleading and its focus on alleging factual detail.
Indeed, the drafters of Rule 8(a) carefully avoided requiring the pleading
of “facts” in order to avert the problems of code pleading, and after the
Civil Rules were adopted, commentators argued that the word “facts”
should be added to Rule 8(a) to ensure that facts would be pleaded. Yet
the drafters of Rule 7(c) wrote the Rule to require the pleading of
“essential facts,” drawing directly on civil and criminal code pleading—
which they treated as equivalent. Moreover, the drafters retained their
pleading language despite being specifically informed that Rule 8(a) did
not refer to “facts” and expressly alerted to the problems of code
pleading that their chosen language might generate. And they apparently
did not expect their language to impose a pleading standard less stringent
than code pleading, since they both treated code pleading as supplying
the appropriate criminal pleading standard and did not consider invoking
both code pleading and Rule 8(a) to be in any way inconsistent.199
Additionally, unlike the drafters of Rule 8(a), the drafters of Rule 7(c)
did not seek to minimize pleading requirements; rather, they wanted to
balance simplification and protecting defendants’ rights and sought to
ensure that defendants could meaningfully understand the allegations
against them.200 Finally, even though the drafters’ pleading language was
intended to be more like Rule 8(a) than the more detailed first draft of
Rule 7(c), the drafters also at times treated that language as having
paraphrased the first draft.
198. Recall that Robinson viewed pleading as “one place where the civil rules and
the criminal rules are different.” See supra notes 150, 161 and accompanying text.
199. Even if, in actuality, Rule 8(a) was less demanding than code pleading.
200. It is worth noting that the above points, to an extent, reflect the different
projects of the drafters of Rule 8(a) and of Rule 7(c). Whereas the drafters of Rule 8(a)
were responding largely to the problems of code pleading, the drafters of Rule 7(c) were
largely responding to the problems of common law pleading. Code pleading was the
solution to common law pleading, whereas minimal pleading was the solution to code
pleading.
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More broadly, the Committee never abrogated the traditional
balance between civil and criminal pleading standards. As noted above,
criminal pleading standards were historically viewed as at least as
stringent as civil ones, both under the common law and the codes. In
designing Rule 7(c), the drafters explicitly drew upon both civil and
criminal pleading requirements interchangeably, showing that they
accepted the idea that those requirements were at least comparable.
Furthermore, the Committee adopted pleading language reminiscent of,
and based on, the civil and criminal codes, thereby incorporating the
historical pleading balance that language represented. The drafters did
so, moreover, notwithstanding that Rule 8(a) was designed to move away
from code pleading. They also, again, avoided simplifying pleadings at
all costs and rejected more radical reforms, such as the short-form
indictment, which might have indicated a desire to upset the traditional
pleading balance.201
Finally, Rule 7(c) was the result of careful deliberation. The drafters
recognized that designing the criminal pleading Rule was a profoundly
important endeavor, central to the project of creating the Criminal Rules.
As a result, they engaged in protracted debate over what should be
required. They refused to decide the matter too quickly, and they
ultimately voted on Rule 7(c) on multiple occasions. Rule 7(c)’s design,
in other words, was a conscious and deliberate choice.
In sum, the drafters of Rule 7(c) crafted the Rule to be at least as
stringent as Rule 8(a).202
B. The Original Design of Rule 7(c) Should Govern Our
Understanding of the Rule Today
The forgoing analysis shows that Rule 7(c) was designed to be at
least as stringent as Rule 8(a). However, that still leaves open the
question of why the original design should control today. This Section
answers that question in two steps. First, it discusses why, in general, the
original design of Rule 7(c) is authoritative as to the Rule’s meaning. It
then explains why that remains true despite Twombly and Iqbal.

201. In addition, several drafters indicated that Rule 7(c) did not change much. See
supra note 141. That further suggests the Rule was not designed to upset the traditional
balance, especially given that Rule 8(a) was intended to minimize civil pleading
requirements. See supra notes 93–98 and accompanying text.
202. Cf. Meyn, supra note 15, at 715–16 (concluding that Rule 8(a) served as the
foundation for Rule 7(c) based on the drafting history of the Criminal Rules (although
discounting, in my view, certain aspects of that history that demonstrate the full import of
Rule 7(c)’s language)).
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1. Why Rule 7(c)’s Original Design Is Authoritative
The original design of Rule 7(c) is authoritative today for three
main reasons. First, as a practical matter, the original design of a rule
necessarily offers powerful insights into its meaning, and that is
especially so for Rule 7(c), given the care with which the drafters
fashioned it and the robust evidence demonstrating what the original
design was. And there does not appear to be any better source for
ascertaining Rule 7(c)’s significance.203
Second, the drafters’ design meets the applicable standards to serve
as a font of interpretive guidance. That design is embodied in the Rule’s
text and original Advisory Committee Note, both firmly established
bases for interpreting the Criminal Rules.204 Additionally, the Supreme
Court has said that “the ‘traditional tools’ of construction”—which apply
to the Federal Rules205—include a provision’s history and purpose,206 and
courts regularly rely on the history of the Criminal Rules and the
drafters’ intent in ascertaining the meaning of the Rules.207 Furthermore,
203. In Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., the Supreme Court indicated that it had to
interpret the Federal Rules as it “understood [them] upon [their] adoption.” Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 861 (1999); accord Access to Courts Hearing, supra
note 26, at 17–18 (statement of Stephen B. Burbank); Burbank, supra note 28, at 117
n.83. But there, the Court was rejecting the notion that it could “alter [a Rule] except
through the process prescribed by Congress in the Rules Enabling Act,” not questioning
reliance on the drafters’ design. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 861–62. Indeed, Ortiz contained a
lengthy discussion of the drafters’ intent. See id. at 838–45. And the Court has never
considered the relationship between Rule 7(c) and Rule 8(a), given that, before Twombly
and Iqbal, there was little need to do so.
204. See, e.g., Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 376 (2013); Horenkamp v. Van
Winkle & Co., 402 F.3d 1129, 1132 (11th Cir. 2005); Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory
Intent: The Place for a “Legislative History” of Agency Rules, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 312
(2000); Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1103, 1122, 1161–67 (2002).
205. See, e.g., United States v. Melvin, 948 F.3d 848, 852 (7th Cir. 2020); Briseno
v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 2017); United States v. Petri, 731
F.3d 833, 839 (9th Cir. 2013); cf. Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters., Inc.,
498 U.S. 533, 540–41 (1991) (treating the Civil Rules as subject to statutory
interpretation principles).
206. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019) (citation omitted).
207. See, e.g., Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 260–61 (1993); United States
v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 270, 280 (2d Cir. 2018); United States v. Rolle, 204 F.3d 133, 137
(4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Navarro, 169 F.3d 228, 237–38 (5th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Restrepo, 832 F.2d 146, 148 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d
1104, 1111 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Pachay, 711 F.2d 488, 490–91 (2d Cir. 1983);
In re Application, 849 F. Supp. 2d 565–66 (D. Md. 2011); United States v. Flowers, 983
F. Supp. 159, 167, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); cf. Scott Dodson, Subclassing, 27 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2351, 2380 & n.187 (2000) (noting where the Supreme Court has relied on the
drafters’ intent and the drafting history in interpreting a Civil Rule); Struve, supra note
204, at 1155–56, 1165–66 (explaining, in the civil context, that “[o]n occasion, the Court
suggests that the relevant question is what the Advisory Committee intended,” and noting
times when that has occurred (even with Justice Scalia’s approval)).
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Rule 7(c)’s text is not patently clear as to the level of detail it requires, so
resort to a broad range of interpretive sources is warranted.208
Third, the value of Rule 7(c)’s original design as an interpretive
resource has not been formally eliminated. Had future Advisory
Committees changed the substance of Rule 7(c) or Rule 8(a), the original
design could have been rendered irrelevant. But that never happened.
Thus, the original design of Rule 7(c) still carries authoritative weight.
2. Why Twombly & Iqbal Do Not Undermine the Authority of
Rule 7(c)’s Original Design
Of course, Twombly and Iqbal reimagined Rule 8(a),209 and that
raises the question of whether we can still rely on the original design of
Rule 7(c) as at least as stringent as Rule 8(a) in interpreting Rule 7(c)
today. The answer is that we can and we should.
First of all, Twombly and Iqbal did not, at least by their terms,
change much. Rather, they simply purported to reject a misconstruction
of Rule 8(a) that arose out of a misreading of Conley and restore a
proper understanding of the Rule. For example, the Court in Twombly
explained:
We could go on, but there is no need to pile up further citations to
show that Conley’s “no set of facts” language has been questioned,
criticized, and explained away long enough. To be fair to the Conley
Court, the passage should be understood in light of the opinion’s
preceding summary of the complaint’s concrete allegations, which
the Court quite reasonably understood as amply stating a claim for
relief. But the passage so often quoted fails to mention this
understanding on the part of the Court, and after puzzling the
profession for 50 years, this famous observation has earned its
retirement. The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative
gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a claim has been
stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts
consistent with the allegations in the complaint. Conley, then,
described the breadth of opportunity to prove what an adequate
complaint claims, not the minimum standard of adequate pleading to
govern a complaint’s survival.210

208. See, e.g., In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 588 F.3d 24, 39
(1st Cir. 2009).
209. Cf. Access to Courts Hearing, supra note 26, at 18 (statement of Stephen B.
Burbank) (treating Twombly and Iqbal as “judicial lawmaking” rather than
“interpretation”).
210. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562–63 (2007) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
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The Court also said that its decision aligned “with [its] statements in the
years since Conley” and that appellate decisions from the 1940s that
“allegedly gave rise to Conley’s ‘no set of facts’ language” “do not
challenge the understanding that . . . a complaint must allege facts
suggestive of illegal conduct.”211 Furthermore, it expressly referenced
model complaint Form 9 (discussed more below212), which had
accompanied the Civil Rules in effectively the same form since their
adoption,213 as exemplifying proper pleading.214 And the Court stated
that, “[i]n reaching [our] conclusion, we do not apply any heightened
pleading standard . . . which can only be accomplished by the process of
amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.”215 Lastly,
the Court in Iqbal explicitly nested its pleading standard within the
historical development of Rule 8(a), asserting that “Rule 8 marks a
notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical, code-pleading
regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a
plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”216 In short, under
Twombly and Iqbal, the Supreme Court’s pleading standard reflects the
original meaning of Rule 8(a)—ostensibly the very meaning the drafters
of the Criminal Rules intended to link to Rule 7(c).
Additionally, even if we ignore what Twombly and Iqbal purported
to do and view them as leading Rule 8(a) away from its original
meaning, the original design of Rule 7(c) should remain authoritative,
given the nature of that design. Had the drafters of Rule 7(c) wanted to
avoid the possibility of the Rule shifting in meaning as a function of Rule
8(a)’s interpretive evolution, they could have easily done so by, for
example, not adopting historically charged language, declining to insert a
cross-reference to Rule 8(a) in the Advisory Committee Note, and
clarifying that they did not want to preserve the traditional balance
between civil and criminal pleading standards. But they did nothing of
the sort. Rather, they carefully associated Rule 7(c) and Rule 8(a). And
given that the drafters were all distinguished legal minds of their day,
they would hardly be surprised by the idea that the meaning of legal
language could change through reinterpretation over time. Accordingly,
they either expected that Rule 7(c)’s meaning would vary along with
Rule 8(a) or, at the very least, assumed the risk of that result by crafting
Rule 7(c) as they did.

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at 563 n.8.
See infra Section III.B.2.
See FED. R. CIV. P. Form 9 (2006); FED. R. CIV. P. Form 9 (1938).
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 n.10.
Id. at 569 n.14 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009).
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Now, there is a complicating factor here that must be addressed at
some length: even though the drafters designed Rule 7(c) to be at least as
stringent as Rule 8(a), they seemingly did not actually intend the Rule to
encompass the Twombly-Iqbal pleading standard.
When the Criminal Rules were adopted, they were accompanied by
“form indictments” meant to illustrate Rule 7(c)’s requirements.217 Those
forms did not require much factual detail, and they even permitted stating
the “facts” in statutory or legalistic language. For example, the form
indictment for receiving a stolen motor vehicle read, “On or about
the [blank] day of [blank], 19 [blank], in the [blank] District of [blank],
John Doe received and concealed a stolen motor vehicle, which was
moving as interstate commerce, and he then knew the motor vehicle to
have been stolen.”218 And the form indictment for first-degree murder on
federal land stated, “On or about the [blank] day of [blank], 19 [blank],
in the [blank] District of [blank], and on lands acquired for the use of the
United States and under the (exclusive) (concurrent) jurisdiction of the
United States, John Doe with premeditation shot and murdered John
Roe.”219
The drafters, moreover, indicated that those types of factually
limited indictments reflected their ideal. During drafting discussions, for
instance, Holtzoff said the idea underlying Crane’s “statement of facts”
language was an indictment that “would allege that the defendant
murdered John Smith by a fatal gunshot wound,” and he approved of
such indictments.220 Medalie made statements to a similar effect.221
Likewise, Holtzoff posited that an indictment would be sufficient if it
provided that, on a specific date, “the defendant transported certain
property, to-wit, certain bonds to the value of $6,000 from New York
City, State of New York, to the City of Washington, District of
Columbia, and said property had been stolen, and the defendant knew the
same to be stolen,” and others seemed to agree.222 Also, in discussing the
“essential facts” language and his experience in New York practice,
Crane asserted:
You charged a murder in the first degree, “in that with premeditation
and deliberation,” and so forth. That constitutes malice. “That with
217. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c) 1944 advisory committee’s note; FED. R. CRIM. P. 58
(1946). The forms have since been abrogated. See, e.g., United States v. White, 980 F.2d
836, 844 (2d Cir. 1992).
218. FED. R. CRIM. P. Form 7 (1946).
219. Id. Form 2.
220. September 1941 Hearing, supra note 143, at 200–02; see also January 1942
Hearing, supra note 169, at 249.
221. See September 1941 Hearing, supra note 143, at 202–03, 206–07; January
1942 Hearing, supra note 169, at 255.
222. September 1941 Hearing, supra note 143, at 215–17.
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premeditation and deliberation,” those are the words of the statute,
“he did kill John Jones on the night of so and so.” Now,
“premeditation and deliberation,” those are facts. “Premeditated and
intended to kill him and did kill him”—those are facts, and those
facts have to be stated.223

Additionally, in Rule 7(c)’s Advisory Committee Note, the drafters
explained that “[t]his rule introduces a simple form of indictment,
illustrated by Forms 1 to 11 in the Appendix of Forms.”224 And the
articles cited in the Note generally praised the form indictment for firstdegree murder or used it to demonstrate Rule 7(c)’s meaning. Holtzoff
maintained, for instance, that that “indictment sets forth all of the
substantive elements of the offense and definitely informs the defendant
of the specific crime of which he is accused.”225 Vanderbilt, likewise,
said that it was “an illustration” of “[t]he form preferred by the
committee.”226 Finally, Cummings proclaimed that the murder
indictment “is clear and explicit,” “sets forth every element of the
offense and accurately acquaints the defendant with the specific crime
with which he is charged,” and “is a great improvement upon the ancient
form.”227
Nevertheless, the original design of Rule 7(c) as at least as stringent
as Rule 8(a) should still govern—even though Twombly and Iqbal are out
of sync with the drafters’ expectations for what Rule 7(c) would require
in practice—for two reasons.
First, Rule 8(a) suffers from exactly the same problem—even
though Twombly and Iqbal interpreted that Rule.228 To start, Rule 8(a)
was also illuminated by model forms, and those forms, just like the
criminal ones, allowed for conclusory and factually limited pleading.229
For instance, the form complaint regarding claims for goods sold and
delivered provided, “Defendant owes plaintiff ten thousand dollars for
goods sold and delivered by plaintiff to defendant between June 1, 1936

223. January 1942 Hearing, supra note 169, at 249–50 (emphasis added).
224. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c) 1944 advisory committee’s note (emphasis added).
225. Holtzoff, supra note 103, at 125.
226. Vanderbilt, supra note 103, at 377.
227. Cummings, supra note 103, at 655.
228. Cf., e.g., Access to Courts Hearing, supra note 26, at 18 (statement of Stephen
B. Burbank) (indicating that Twombly and Iqbal rejected “the system of notice pleading
that Clark intended, that Congress and the bar were told in 1938 had been implemented in
the Federal Rules, and that the Supreme Court embraced as early as 1947,” and replaced
it with a standard “that is hard to distinguish from that which the drafters of the Federal
Rules explicitly rejected”).
229. See FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (1938). Those forms were initially illustrative, later
deemed “sufficient,” and ultimately abrogated. FED. R. CIV. P. 84 advisory committee’s
notes to 1946 and 2015 amendments.
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and December 1, 1936.”230 The form complaint for conversion, likewise,
stated, “On or about December 1, 1936, defendant converted to his own
use ten bonds of the [blank] Company (here insert brief identification as
by number and issue) of the value of ten thousand dollars, the property of
plaintiff.”231 And the form complaint for negligence said, “On June 1,
1936, in a public highway called Boylston Street in Boston,
Massachusetts, defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against
plaintiff who was then crossing said highway.”232
Moreover, the idea that the model complaints and indictments
reflected comparably light anticipated pleading standards, and therefore
that Rule 8(a) suffers from a similar disconnect to Twombly and Iqbal as
Rule 7(c), is far from idiosyncratic. Indeed, “Charles E. Clark, the
‘principal draftsman’ of the [Civil] Rules” and Reporter to the original
Civil Rules Advisory Committee,233 wrote an opinion while later serving
as a Second Circuit judge that treated the form indictment for murder and
the form complaint for negligence as equivalently general. In his words:
There seems to be some tendency to confuse general pleadings with
entire absence of statement of claim or charge. But this is a mistake,
for general pleadings, far from omitting a claim or charge, do convey
information to the intelligent and sophisticated circle for which they
are designed. Thus the charge that at a certain time and place “John
Doe with premeditation shot and murdered John Roe,” F.R.Cr.P.,
Form 2, even though of comparatively few words, has made clear the
offense it is bringing before the court. [Then, in a footnote:] So also
the famous Form 9 of the Civil Rules, “Complaint for Negligence,”
shows a complete claim for damages for personal injuries. 234

What is more, the drafters of the Civil Rules broadly indicated that
they expected Rule 8(a) to establish a relaxed standard that would not
require alleging facts and would allow pleading conclusions—in contrast
to the interpretation supplied by Twombly and Iqbal. For example, during
the drafting process, Advisory Committee member George Pepper
suggested pleading-requirement language that eliminated the word
“facts.”235 He explained that using that word, or the like, leads to “this
endless discussion as to the distinction between fact and law” and does
not “add[] anything in the way of clarity,” and he suggested not requiring

230. FED. R. CIV. P. Form 5 (1938).
231. Id. Form 11.
232. Id. Form 9.
233. Campbell, supra note 89, at 8, 10 (citation omitted).
234. United States v. Lamont, 236 F.2d 312, 317 & n.9 (2d Cir. 1956).
235. See Proceedings of Meeting of Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil
Procedure of the Supreme Court of the United States, U.S. COURTS 253, 263, 278, 281–
82 (Feb. 1936) [hereinafter February 1936 Hearing], https://bit.ly/3eGmVgj.
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pleading “facts” because that was “tried unsuccessfully in the codes, as
evidenced by the amount of disputation in the cases as to what [words
like ‘facts’] mean.”236 And he later said:
[I]f you take these distinctions between law and fact, you get
involved in all sorts of contradictions. If you are really strictly
thinking about it, and are bound by the rule that you must state facts
and not conclusions of law, or that you must state conclusions of law
and not facts, you could not draw a libel in divorce, because you
could not state that the parties had been married. The statement that
they had been married is a statement of fact, and it is a statement of a
conclusion of law from the fact. There is no end to the subtleties in
which you may engage if you undertake to make those
refinements.237

A motion to adopt Pepper’s phrasing ultimately carried.238
During the discussion of Pepper’s language, moreover, others
indicated that that language would largely eliminate the distinction
between factual and legal allegations. One member, for instance, warned
that the idea that it is “no longer . . . necessary to state facts” in a
pleading “is going to be very far-reaching, and a very decided change in
pleading in this country.”239 A second argued that “you would [not] get
anywhere by using the term ‘facts’ except into the difficulty that we have
all gotten into in the code states” involving the “impossibility” of
“draw[ing] a sharp line between facts, conclusions of law and
evidence.”240 Another maintained that he supported “relax[ing] the
requirements on the pleader” in line with Pepper’s proposal because civil
pleading rules requiring factual allegations but not legal or evidentiary
ones had caused trouble.241
Outside the drafting process, but around the time of the Civil Rules’
adoption, Rule 8(a)’s drafters also expressed the view that pleading rules
should be exceedingly flexible and that alleging legal conclusions should
be acceptable.242 For example, Clark explained:
The old requirement that a party must plead only facts, avoiding
evidence on the one hand and law on the other, was logically
indefensible, since the actual distinction is at most one of degree only
and in actual practice it caused more confusion than any possible
worth it might have as admonition. The new rules provide only for a

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id. at 264.
Id. at 280–81.
See id. at 302.
Id. at 287.
Id. at 294.
Id. at 299–300.
See, e.g., supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text.
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short and plain statement of claim or defense showing that the party
is entitled to the relief claimed or the action of the court desired; and
there is only the further general admonition that each averment of a
pleading shall be set forth as simply, concisely, and directly as the
circumstances permit.243

He likewise said: “Then there is also contemplated a very simple, concise
system of allegation and defense. Some lawyers have been quite a little
worried for fear there was not enough required in the way of detailed
pleading, but nevertheless this system calls for very brief and direct
allegations.”244 And James Moore—Clark’s assistant during the drafting
process—maintained that “[t]he pleading rules are designed to . . . reduce
the pleading requirements to a minimum,” “make[] pleadings relatively
unimportant,” and require pleadings that “do little more than sketch the
type of battle that is to follow.”245
Several members of the Advisory Committee, moreover, articulated
comparable sentiments. One member, for instance, said:
The reason [that the word “fact” does not appear in Rule 8] is,
nobody knows what “facts” are; courts have been trying for five
hundred years to find “facts” and nobody has ever been able to draw
a line between what were and what were not “facts.” Since the word
“facts” has given a great deal of trouble the suggestion was, Why not
eliminate it? . . . .
. . . . The test [of a good pleading under the new rules] is whether
information is given sufficient to enable the party to plead and to
prepare for trial. A legal conclusion may serve the purpose of
pleading as well as anything else if it gives the proper information.246

Another asserted:
What these rules do emphasize with respect to the contents of a
pleading (as the forms in the Appendix show) is that any plain telling
of the story that shows that the pleader is entitled to relief upon the
grounds he states is sufficient to bring the pleader’s cause into court.
That the statement or averment includes a conclusion of law is no
ground for a motion to strike or for a motion to make definite, merely

243. Charles E. Clark, The Proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 22 A.B.A. J.
447, 450 (1936).
244. Clark, supra note 94, at 552. It has also been observed that “it is difficult to
find Twombly’s (let alone Iqbal’s) standards in the relevant work of Charles
Clark . . . and difficult to separate his views from those of the Advisory Committee.”
Access to Courts Hearing, supra note 26, at 17.
245. Moore, supra note 95, at 559, 561.
246. Sunderland, supra note 98, at 12; accord Edson R. Sunderland, The
Availability of the New Federal Rules for Use in the State Courts of Ohio, 4 OHIO ST. U.
L.J. 143, 145 (1938).
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because the statement or averment embodies a conclusion which
might be elaborated by a more particularized detailing of the facts.247

Lastly, a third member, in testifying to Congress about the Civil Rules
after they were proposed, explained:
You used to have the requirement that a complaint must allege the
“facts” constituting the “cause of action.” I can show you thousands
of cases that have gone wrong on dialectical, psychological, and
technical argument as to whether a pleading contained a “cause of
action”; and of whether certain allegations were allegations of “fact”
or were “conclusions of law” or were merely “evidentiary” as
distinguished from “ultimate” facts. In these rules there is no
requirement that the pleader . . . must allege “facts” or “ultimate
facts.” [Rule 8 prescribes] the essential thing, reduced to its
narrowest possible requirement, “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”248

Second, Twombly and Iqbal’s focus on pleading facts rather than
conclusions fits much better with Rule 7(c) than Rule 8(a), if it fits
anywhere at all. Unlike the drafters of the Civil Rules, the drafters of the
Criminal Rules did not reject any requirement of pleading “facts.”
Rather, they expressly adopted an “essential facts” pleading requirement,
invoked code pleading standards that demanded alleging “facts,” and did
not respond to warnings and commentary about using the word “facts.”
Furthermore, Rule 7(c)’s drafters repeatedly emphasized the
importance of pleading facts. Many examples of that are set out above,
given the Committee’s focus on Crane’s “statement of facts” language.249
But there are yet others. For instance, early in the discussions, Crane
said:
I myself think that we should have a statement of the facts, but I do
not like to say how the facts should be stated. There are so many
different facts, but when you state these facts you know that when
they are true that a crime has been committed.250

And later, in discussing his experience in New York practice and Rule
7(c)’s “essential facts” language, Crane observed:

247. Access to Courts Hearing, supra note 26, at 5 n.10 (statement of Stephen B.
Burbank) (citation omitted).
248. Id. at 4 (statement of Stephen B. Burbank) (alteration in original) (citation
omitted).
249. See, e.g., supra notes 152, 155–157, 160–161, 163, 170–171, 178 and
accompanying text.
250. September 1941 Hearing, supra note 143, at 202.
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We had to use the words. We had to state the facts. But the other
adjectives were all left out, and that was covered by the first
sentence, which is“plain and concise and definite statement of the essential
facts.”
F-a-c-t-s! Facts are so important to all of us. We think we always get
to the law before we get to the facts, but the facts must be stated
which constitute an offence charged against the accused.
I do not see how you can narrow that, and I do not see how you can
enlarge upon it. And, as you know, we have found it worked pretty
well.251

Additionally, even Dession, in arguing for a short-form indictment, said,
“I suppose we would all agree that before the pleading is finished facts
should be set out which clearly cover every substantive detail of an
offence,” with “the only question” being “in which paper [the facts of the
offense] must all appear.”252
The drafters also made similar statements in the articles cited in
Rule 7(c)’s Advisory Committee Note. For example, Medalie asserted
that “[i]t is hoped that this new rule will lead to the swift abolition of the
lengthy, wordy and obscure indictments which obfuscated, rather than
stated, the facts constituting the crime.”253 Holtzoff, likewise, stated that
the Committee had “deliberately rejected” short-form indictments that do
not “specify[] or summariz[e] the facts,” and that “[a] simple indictment,
briefly and succinctly setting forth the facts of the specific crime, seems
far preferable.”254
In short, even though the drafters did not intend for Rule 7(c) to
impose the pleading standard set by Twombly and Iqbal, neither did the
drafters of Rule 8(a), and if Twombly and Iqbal’s fact-intensive standard
has any place at all, it is with Rule 7(c). Thus, the fact that the drafters’
expectations for what Rule 7(c) would require are in tension with
Twombly and Iqbal should not undermine the foregoing analysis.
3. Concluding Comments
To conclude, the original design of Rule 7(c) should govern our
interpretation of the Rule today. It is an exceedingly potent source of
guidance, an eminently appropriate basis for interpretation, and nothing
formally eliminates its interpretive power. Furthermore, even though

251.
252.
253.
254.

January 1942 Hearing, supra note 169, at 250 (emphasis added).
Id. at 253, 258.
Medalie, supra note 103, at 3.
Holtzoff, supra note 103, at 125–26.
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Twombly and Iqbal reimagined Rule 8(a), they only purported to restore
the original meaning of the Rule—at least nominally the very meaning
that the drafters of Rule 7(c) relied upon; the drafters expected or could
have anticipated variation in Rule 7(c)’s meaning, given their design of
the Rule; and the fact that the drafters did not expect to create a
Twombly-Iqbal-like pleading standard should not matter. Accordingly, as
long as Twombly and Iqbal set the civil pleading standard, Rule 7(c)
should impose a criminal standard that is at least as demanding.
IV. WHY COUNTERARGUMENTS ARE UNPERSUASIVE
To be sure, there are counterarguments, both ones that could be
raised and that have been raised by courts and the Advisory Committee
itself. This Part therefore addresses a series of legal counterarguments
anticipated by the author and advanced by the aforementioned
authorities. In the end, however, these objections are unavailing.
A. Anticipated Counterargument: Rule 7(c) Does Not Require
Prosecutors to Specify the “Means” of the Crime
This Part begins with a counterargument anticipated by the author:
that Rule 7(c) has always allowed the prosecutor to “allege that the
means by which the defendant committed the offense are unknown or
that the defendant committed it by one or more specified means,”255 and
so the Rule cannot demand factual allegations like those required by
Twombly and Iqbal. Although not a weak point, it is unpersuasive.
First, although Twombly and Iqbal, applied in the criminal context,
might be limited by Rule 7(c)’s “means” provision, that would only be so
when the means are actually unknown. Allowing prosecutors to say that
the means are unknown in a particular case is different from treating any
factually barren indictment as sufficient.
Second, essentially the same principle animating the “means”
provision applies to Rule 8 and served as no barrier to Twombly and
Iqbal. Civil Rule 8(e)(2) originally said that “[a] party may set forth two
or more statements of a claim or defense alternately or hypothetically,
either in one count or defense or in separate counts or defenses.”256
Effectively the same statement now appears in Civil Rule 8(d)(2).257 And
in explaining Rule 8(e) around the time of its promulgation, Clark stated:
The rules definitely permit a considerable choice to the pleader as to
how he shall tell his story. Thus prohibitions developed in certain
codes against alternative or conditional statements are expressly
255. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1); see FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c) (1946) (similar).
256. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e)(2) (1938).
257. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(2).
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removed. If he is not sure of his facts he may show what his doubt is
so long as he honestly sets forth what he knows.258

In short, like Rule 7(c), Rule 8 accounts for circumstances in which a
party lacks knowledge and allows him to “show his doubt.”
Moreover, the drafters of the Civil Rules indicated that the means of
the legal violation did not need to be stated. For example, in discussing
the model complaint for negligence, which did not require specifying the
details—or means—of the negligence at hand, Clark said:
Now some lawyers have thought that further details should be added.
But details will not necessarily paint a truer picture. They may even
mislead. . . . So with our form, what can be added with profit?
Defective brakes, lack of headlights, failure to keep a lookout, etc.? It
would be nice, indeed, for the plaintiff if the defendant would admit
any of these things. And yet it is the plaintiff who is making the
allegations. Moreover none of them are primary or ultimate in the
sense that even if they existed the case would be proven.259

Hence, Rule 8, like Rule 7(c), was designed to allow one to plead
without full knowledge and leave the “means” unspecified. Given that
Twombly and Iqbal govern Rule 8(a) anyway, Rule 7(c)’s “means”
provision should not serve as a barrier to applying a similar pleading
standard in criminal cases.
Third, and finally, the goal of Rule 7(c)’s “means” provision was
not to create any major difference between Rule 8 and Rule 7(c). As the
original Advisory Committee Note to Rule 7(c) explained:
The provision . . . that it may be alleged in a single count that the
means by which the defendant committed the offense are unknown,
or that he committed it by one or more specified means, is intended
to eliminate the use of multiple counts for the purpose of alleging the
commission of the offense by different means or in different ways.
Cf. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8(e)(2).260

In other words, the “means” provision was designed to prevent the use of
multiple counts for alleging different ways in which a violation of law
might have occurred—just like Rule 8(e)(2) allowed—and the drafters
tied Rule 7(c) and Rule 8(e)(2) together by way of a cross-reference. The
Note mentions nothing special about allowing prosecutors to admit when
they do not know the means. Consequently, nothing indicates that the

258. Clark, supra note 97, at 316 (emphasis added).
259. Id. at 317.
260. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c) 1944 advisory committee’s note.
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“means” provision should affect the interplay between Rule 8(a) and
Rule 7(c).261
B. Counterarguments from the Courts
Next, we must consider the counterarguments from judicial
decisions. Those counterarguments include: (1) that nothing in Twombly
and Iqbal suggests their applicability to criminal cases; (2) that a
defendant challenging the sufficiency of an indictment must establish
prejudice; (3) that a defendant can obtain a bill of particulars; (4) that
Rule 8(a) requires a “showing” of entitlement to relief, whereas Rule 7(c)
does not; (5) that Rule 7(c) was designed to reduce technicalities,
procedural complexity, and detailed allegations; and (6) that criminal
procedure and civil procedure are simply different.
1. Nothing in Twombly or Iqbal Suggests They Were Meant to
Apply to Criminal Cases
The first judicial counterargument is that Twombly and Iqbal should
not apply in the criminal context because nothing in them indicates that
they apply to criminal cases.262 That argument is unpersuasive, however,
for two reasons. First, the point of the foregoing analysis is that Rule 7(c)
should be interpreted in perspective of the prevailing interpretation of
Rule 8(a), meaning that the Supreme Court did not need to discuss
criminal cases in Twombly and Iqbal for its reinterpretation of Rule 8(a)
to require a reinterpretation of Rule 7(c). In other words, raising the
criminal pleading standard is a consequence of reinterpreting Rule 8(a),
not an application of Twombly and Iqbal. Second, because Twombly and
Iqbal were civil cases and the connection between Rule 7(c) and Rule
8(a) was not fully fleshed out until now, the Supreme Court had no
occasion to consider the implications of reinterpreting Rule 8(a) for
criminal cases.

261. In fact, the drafters of Rule 7(c) thought the Civil Rules would do more than
the Criminal Rules in this context. Holtzoff said, for instance:
Lots of people thought there was going to be uproar against the provision in the
Civil Rules that you can have alternative allegations and hypothetical
allegations. Of course, we are not going to suggest hypothetical allegations for
an indictment, I suppose, but the Civil Rules go further and they permit both
hypothetical and alternative.
March–April 1942 Hearing, supra note 170, at 296–97.
262. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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2. A Defendant Challenging an Indictment Must Establish
Prejudice
The second judicial argument is that the Twombly-Iqbal pleading
standard is inappropriate in the criminal context because a defendant
challenging an indictment must establish prejudice to prevail.263 But that
argument, too, is unavailing.
Tracing that argument back through the cases cited to support it,264
it is based on a federal statute passed in 1872, which stated:
No indictment . . . shall be deemed insufficient, nor shall the trial,
judgment, or other proceeding thereon be affected by reason of any
defect or imperfection in matter of form only, which shall not tend to
the prejudice of the defendant.265

There also existed a similar statute that applied to civil and criminal
cases, which provided:
On the hearing of any appeal, certiorari, writ of error, or motion for a
new trial, in any case, civil or criminal, the court shall give judgment
after an examination of the entire record before the court, without
regard to technical errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect
the substantial rights of the parties.266

Those statutes were repealed in 1948.267 But their substance was retained
in Criminal Rule 52(a),268 which says that “[a]ny error, defect,
irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be
disregarded.”269
The Civil Rules contain a similar “harmless error” provision. Under
Rule 61:
Unless justice requires otherwise, no error in admitting or excluding
evidence—or any other error by the court or a party—is ground for
granting a new trial, for setting aside a verdict, or for vacating,
modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order. At every

263. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
264. See United States v. Castillo Madrigal, No. 12-cr-62-bbc-04, 2013 WL
12099089, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 30, 2013), adopted, 2013 WL 12099088, at *1 (Feb. 21,
2013); United States v. Castaldi, 547 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Webster, 125 F.3d 1024, 1029 (7th Cir. 1997); Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749,
763 (1962); Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 9 (1959); Hagner v. United States, 285
U.S. 427, 431–32 (1932).
265. Hagner, 285 U.S. at 431–32.
266. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) 1944 advisory committee’ note.
267. See United States v. Williams, 203 F.2d 572, 573 (5th Cir. 1953).
268. See id.; FED R. CRIM P. 52(a) 1944 advisory committee’s note.
269. FED R. CRIM P. 52(a). Rule 52(a) remains essentially the same as when
originally adopted. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) (1946).
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stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and
defects that do not affect any party’s substantial rights.270

Not only are Rule 61 and Rule 52(a) linguistically similar, but also
they share the same lineage and are inextricably intertwined. Rule 61 was
designed as a combination of the second harmless error statute
referenced above (the one applicable to civil cases) and another similar
statute for civil cases, with unspecified modifications.271 Additionally,
the original Advisory Committee Note to Rule 52(a) stated that “[a]
similar provision is found in Rule 61 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.”272 And Lester Orfield, one of the drafters of the Criminal
Rules, explained shortly after the adoption of Rule 52(a) that the Rule
“really amounts to a shortened form of the second sentence of Civil Rule
61.”273
Federal courts have also repeatedly concluded that Rule 61 is
effectively the same as Rule 52(a). For example, the Fifth Circuit has
observed that “Civil Rule 61 combines in a single rule the harmless and
plain error rules stated in Criminal Rule 52(a) and (b).”274 Likewise, the
Third Circuit has said that it “do[es] not perceive a clear distinction
between the two” Rules.275 And courts consistently refer to the Rules
interchangeably or as imposing essentially the same requirements.276
Furthermore, Rule 61 applies to pleadings. As explained in Federal
Practice and Procedure on Rule 61, “Technical errors in pleading

270. FED. R. CIV. P. 61. Rule 61 remains essentially the same as when originally
adopted. See FED. R. CIV. P. 61 (1938).
271. See FED. R. CIV. P. 61 1937 advisory committee’s note; see also Hoiness v.
United States, 335 U.S. 297, 300 n.6 (1948) (reciting the similar civil statute).
272. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) 1944 advisory committee’s note.
273. Lester B. Orfield, Two Years of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 22
TEMP. L.Q. 46, 60 n.271 (1948).
274. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1424 (5th Cir. 1996) (en
banc).
275. McQueeney v. Wilmington Tr. Co., 779 F.2d 916, 927 n.17 (3d Cir. 1985).
276. See, e.g., O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 441–42 (1995); Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 & n.5 (1967); United States v. Barton, 909 F.3d 1323, 1337–
38 (11th Cir. 2018); United States v. Reid, 751 F.3d 763, 767 (6th Cir. 2014); Christian v.
United States, 337 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003); United States v. Patterson, 215 F.3d
776, 782 (7th Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 531 U.S. 1033 (2000); Friends of
Keesville, Inc. v. FERC, 859 F.2d 230, 234 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1988); CalMat Co. v.
Oldcastle Precast, Inc., Civ. No. 16-26 KG/JHR, 2018 WL 3025053, at *2 (D.N.M. June
21, 2018); Creter v. Arvonio, Civ. A. No. 92-4493, 1993 WL 306425, at *6 (D.N.J. Aug.
5, 1993); see also 11 MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2881,
2883 (3d ed. 2021). Indeed, if anything, Rule 61 could be viewed as more forgiving of
error than Rule 52(a). See, e.g., McQueeney, 779 F.2d at 925; 3B PETER J. HENNING,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 853 (4th ed. 2021); KANE, supra, § 2883.
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usually are treated as harmless and disregarded.”277 Courts have invoked
Rule 61 in, or connected it to, the pleading context as well.278
In sum, the basis for the “prejudice” argument is “harmless error,”
which applies to both civil and criminal procedure and to civil pleadings.
Accordingly, that argument does nothing to counter this Article’s
position.
3. A Defendant Can Obtain a Bill of Particulars
The third argument from the courts is that Twombly and Iqbal
should not apply to criminal cases because a defendant who wants more
detail about his case may seek a bill of particulars.279 But that argument
fails too.
First, the bill of particulars mechanism appeared in the original
Criminal Rules.280 Thus, the relationship between Rule 7(c) and Rule
8(a) that the drafters established was created in perspective of that
mechanism, and it cannot be used to undermine the modern consequence
of that relationship for the criminal pleading standard.
Second, the drafters crafted Rule 7(c) to avoid the need for bills of
particulars. Indeed, they specifically rejected short-form indictments for
that reason.281 Consequently, relying on bills of particulars to justify
interpreting Rule 7(c) as less demanding than Rule 8(a) would be an
egregious inversion of the Rule’s design.282

277. KANE, supra note 276, § 2884.
278. See, e.g., M.G.B. Homes, Inc., v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1489
(11th Cir. 1990); Dye Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 698 F.2d 423, 425 n.6 (10th Cir. 1983);
McCoy v. Providence Journal Co., 190 F.2d 760, 766 (1st Cir. 1951); Rawls v. Paradise
Artists, Inc., No. 3:18-cv-0417, 2019 WL 7482142, at *4 & n.6 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 16,
2019); Griesinger v. Univ. of Cincinnati, No. 1:13-cv-808, 2016 WL 2349112, at *5
(S.D. Ohio May 3, 2016); Capital Mach. Co. v. Miller Veneers, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-00702JMS-DML, 2012 WL 243563, at *3 n.3 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 25, 2012); Spencer Cty. Redev.
Comm’n v. AK Steel Corp., No. 3:09-cv-00066-RLY-WGH, 2011 WL 3806947, at *2–3
(S.D. Ind. Aug. 26, 2011); Aretakis v. Durivage, Civ. No. 1:07-CV-1273 (RFT), 2009
WL 2567781, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2009); Foote v. Barnhart, No. 3:06-00686, 2008
WL 2756256, at *10 (M.D. Tenn. July 15, 2008); IQ Grp., Ltd. v. Wiesner Publ’g, LLC,
No. Civ.A. 03-5221(JAG), 2005 WL 3544335, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 2005);
Mioduszewska v. Bd. of Educ., No. 93 CIV. 3843 (VLB), 1993 WL 564902, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 1993); Courtney v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 371 F. Supp. 401, 402 (D. Wyo.
1974).
279. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
280. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(f) (1946).
281. See supra notes 141, 178–186 and accompanying text.
282. To be sure, the original bill of particulars provision only allowed granting bills
“for cause,” FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(f) (1946), and that limitation was removed in 1966 “to
encourage a more liberal attitude by the courts toward bills of particulars,” FED. R. CRIM.
P. 7 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment. But that change did not affect the
requirements of Rule 7(c).
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Third, as the drafters originally anticipated, bills of particulars do
little in practice. First of all, several decisions have indicated that the test
for whether a bill should be granted is quite similar to the test for
whether an indictment is sufficient,283 and others have found bare-bones
or nonspecific indictments adequate to render a bill unnecessary.284
Additionally, a bill of particulars will generally be denied if the
defendant had access to information about his case through other means
(for example, court filings and hearings, discovery, personal
observations),285 even if those means do not specify the government’s
allegations or only present information about them indirectly,
haphazardly, close to trial, or in a burdensome manner.286 Moreover,
whether to grant a bill is left to the trial court’s broad discretion, and a
denial will not be overturned unless the defendant can show prejudice
and/or surprise as a result.287 Accordingly, “[m]otions for bills of
particulars are seldom employed”288—like the drafters intended—and
their existence does not suggest that Rule 7(c) should be interpreted
leniently.
Finally, the Civil Rules provide for a mechanism that is similar to
the bill of particulars. Criminal bills of particulars are used to clarify the
pleadings.289 Civil Rule 12(e), likewise, allows a motion for “a more
definite statement of a pleading . . . which is so vague or ambiguous that
the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.”290 Given that Twombly
and Iqbal amplified the pleading standard on the civil side anyway, the
283. See, e.g., United States v. Leahy, 598 F. App’x 210, 212 (4th Cir. 2015) (per
curiam); United States v. Vaughn, 722 F.3d 918, 927 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v.
Moody, 923 F.2d 341, 351 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Chenaur, 552 F.2d 294, 302
(9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Ligambi, Criminal Action Nos. 09-00496-01, 03–08,
10–11, 14–15, 2012 WL 2362638, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2012).
284. See, e.g., United States v. Al Jaber, 436 F. App’x 9, 12 (2d Cir. 2011) (per
curiam); United States v. Nelson-Rodriguez, 319 F.3d 12, 30–31 (1st Cir. 2003); United
States v. Belardo-Quiñones, 71 F.3d 941, 943–44 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v.
Cephas, 937 F.2d 816, 823 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Serrano-Serrano, No. 2:16-cr56-RJS-PMW, 2016 WL 7217632, at *2 (D. Utah Dec. 13, 2016); United States v. Dyer,
No. 3:07-CR-39, 2007 WL 2326899, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 10, 2007).
285. See, e.g., United States v. Lundstrom, 880 F.3d 423, 439–40 (8th Cir. 2018);
United States v. Huggans, 650 F.3d 1210, 1220 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Blanchard, 542 F.3d 1133, 1140–41 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d
436, 445–46 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 771–72 (3d Cir.
2005); United States v. Robinson, 390 F.3d 853, 867 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Ivy, 83 F.3d 1266, 1281–82 (10th Cir. 1996).
286. See, e.g., Mejia, 448 F.3d at 446; Robinson, 390 F.3d at 867; Ivy, 83 F.3d at
1281–82; Serrano-Serrano, 2016 WL 7217632, at *2.
287. See, e.g., Lundstrom, 880 F.3d at 439; Huggans, 650 F.3d at 1220; Blanchard,
542 F.3d at 1140; Mejia, 448 F.3d at 445; Urban, 404 F.3d at 771–72; Robinson, 390
F.3d at 867; Ivy, 83 F.3d at 1281.
288. United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1192 (1st Cir. 1993).
289. See, e.g., Lundstrom, 880 F.3d at 439; Ivy, 83 F.3d at 1281.
290. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e).
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criminal bill of particulars cannot be used to argue against similarly
bolstering the criminal pleading standard.
4. Rule 8(a) Requires a “Showing” of Entitlement to Relief,
Whereas Rule 7(c) Does Not
The fourth case law argument is that Rule 8(a) is more demanding
than Rule 7(c) because Rule 8(a) requires a “showing” that the pleader is
entitled to relief, whereas Rule 7(c) does not.291
It is true that Twombly said that its pleading standard “reflects the
threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) that the ‘plain statement’ possess
enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief’” and that
“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of
entitlement to relief,” devoid of factual adornment.292 But Rule 8(a)
contained the “showing” of entitlement to relief language at the time
Rule 7(c) was crafted, meaning that the drafters of Rule 7(c) were fully
aware of it when they created the Rule and determined its relationship to
Rule 8(a).293 Moreover, Rule 7(c) adopted the code pleading language
that Rule 8(a) had repudiated to liberalize pleading and eliminate the
problems of requiring the allegation of “facts.” Hence, the language of
Rule 8(a) does not undermine this Article’s analysis.
5. Rule 7(c) Was Designed to Reduce Technicalities,
Procedural Complexity & Detailed Allegations
The fifth argument that appears in the case law is that Rule 7(c) was
designed to reduce technicalities, procedural complexity, and detailed
allegations.294 Although true, the drafters of Rule 7(c) used Rule 8(a) as a
model of the simplicity they wanted to achieve, and Rule 8(a) seems to
have simplified pleadings more than Rule 7(c). And Rule 7(c)’s drafters
did not decide to simplify pleadings at all costs. Rather, they eschewed
short-form indictments and sought to promote defendants’ rights.
6. Criminal Procedure & Civil Procedure Are Different
Finally, courts maintain that Twombly and Iqbal should not apply to
indictments because criminal and civil procedure are fundamentally
different, for example, with respect to discovery burdens and the
constitutional protections defendants receive.295 However, the drafters of
Rule 7(c) designed the Rule as they did with full knowledge of, and
291.
292.
original).
293.
294.
295.

See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3, 557 (2007) (alteration in
See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (1938).
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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indeed in spite of, the fact that criminal and civil procedure are generally
quite different. At the time the drafters created the Rule, furthermore, the
Civil Rules contained expansive discovery provisions and the
Constitution offered criminal defendants a host of distinct protections.
Therefore, the differences between criminal and civil procedure cannot
justify refusing to amplify the criminal pleading standard in line with its
original design.
C. Counterarguments from the Advisory Committee
The final set of counterarguments comes from the Advisory
Committee’s decision to reject the 2016 proposal to strengthen the
criminal pleading standard. The Committee offered three main legal
arguments for doing so: (1) that courts uphold bare-bones indictments;
(2) that minimal pleading is hundreds of years old and raising the
criminal pleading standard would be a return to the common law; and (3)
that raising the pleading standard would create new substantive rights.
1. Courts Uphold Bare-Bones Indictments
The Committee’s first argument asserts that criminal pleading
practices are set by appellate decisions that uphold bare-bones
indictments.296 But pleading requirements are actually set by the
Criminal Rules, which are then interpreted by courts.297 Thus, saying that
the criminal pleading standard should not change because appellate
decisions have upheld bare-bones indictments puts the cart before the
horse and, in any event, fails to account for the original design of Rule
7(c), which shows that court decisions interpreting Rule 7(c) should be
rethought.
2. Minimal Pleading Is Hundreds of Years Old & Raising the
Criminal Pleading Standard Would Be a Return to the
Common Law
The second Committee argument maintains “that minimal pleading
in criminal cases is hundreds of years old” and that aligning the criminal
and civil pleading standards would operate as a “return to the old
common law pleading rules.”298 But each component of that argument
does not withstand scrutiny.

296. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
297. Cf. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569 n.14 (“[W]e do not apply any heightened
pleading standard . . . which can only be accomplished by the process of amending the
Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
298. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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As to the point that minimal pleading is hundreds of years old, that
point seems to be channeling the accurate proposition that indictments
drawn in statutory language have long been held sufficient—at least
subject to the qualification that the statutory language must sufficiently
apprise the defendant of the allegations against her.299 However, while
the point may be true, it does not make a persuasive argument.
As explained previously, before the Federal Rules there was a wellestablished pleading balance that treated criminal pleading requirements
as at least as rigorous as civil ones. And in line with that balance, courts
historically indicated that the rule in the criminal context allowing
pleadings to employ statutory language applied to non-criminal cases as
well. For instance, in 1907, the Circuit Court for the District of
Massachusetts said that, with respect to a civil action under the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act, “it is not sufficient to frame the declaration in the words
of the statute” because “[t]he statute does not set forth the elements of
the offenses which are forbidden,” and to support that conclusion, it
quoted a criminal case under the Act holding that the Act “is not one of
the class where it is always sufficient to declare in the words of the
enactment, as it does not set forth all the elements of a crime.”300
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Kansas, in 1919, said: “In criminal
pleading, where the statute creates an offense and sets out the facts which
constitute it, an information that follows the language of the statute is
good. The same rule of pleading should, and does, apply in civil
actions.”301 There are myriad similar examples.302 Thus, if “minimal”

299. See, e.g., Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 83–84 (1908);
United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612–13 (1881); United States v. Simmons, 96 U.S.
360, 362 (1877); Summers v. United States, 11 F.2d 583, 584 (4th Cir. 1926); United
States v. Burns, 54 F. 351, 360–61 (C.C.D.W. Va. 1893); United States v. Green, 26 F.
Cas. 32, 32 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1879) (No. 15,257); United States v. Schuler, 27 F. Cas. 978,
980 (C.C.D. Mich. 1853) (No. 16,234); Grattan v. State, 71 Ala. 344, 345 (1882); State v.
Brown, 4 Port. 410, 413 (Ala. 1837); Caldwell v. State, 83 S.W. 929, 929–30 (Ark.
1904); People v. Ward, 42 P. 894, 895 (Cal. 1895); State v. Patten, 64 N.E. 850, 851 (Ind.
1902); State v. Brandt, 41 Iowa 593, 607–08 (1875); Commonwealth v. Black, 20 S.W.2d
741, 742 (Ky. 1929); Commonwealth v. Stout, 46 Ky. (7 B. Mon.) 247, 249 (1847); State
v. Munsey, 96 A. 729, 729–30 (Me. 1916); State v. Burke, 52 S.W. 226, 227–28 (Mo.
1899); Jordan v. State, 3 S.W.2d 159, 160 (Tenn. 1928); Richardson v. Fletcher, 52 A.
1064, 1068 (Vt. 1902); State v. Martin, 162 P. 356, 358 (Wash. 1917); State v.
Parkersburg Brewing Co., 45 S.E. 924, 925 (W. Va. 1903).
300. Cilley v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 152 F. 726, 728–29 (C.C.D. Mass. 1907).
301. Patrick v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 181 P. 611, 612 (Kan. 1919) (citation omitted).
302. See, e.g., United States v. 385 Barrels, etc., of Wine, 300 F. 565, 565
(S.D.N.Y. 1924); United States v. Or. Short Line Ry. Co., 180 F. 483, 484 (D. Idaho
1908); Smith v. Witcher, 60 So. 391, 392 (Ala. 1912); St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v.
Phillips, 51 So. 638, 641 (Ala. 1910); Cotton v. Holloway, 12 So. 172, 174 (Ala. 1892);
Hollenbacher v. Bryant, 30 A.2d 561, 562–63 (Del. Super. Ct. 1943); Lynam v. Hastings,
185 A. 91, 91–92 (Del. Super. Ct. 1936); O’Brien v. Wilmington Provision Co., 148 A.
294, 295 (Del. Super. Ct. 1929); Wailuku Sugar Co. v. Spreckels, 13 Haw. 527, 530
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pleading was the historical norm in criminal cases, so too was it in civil
cases. Yet Twombly and Iqbal came down as they did anyway—and were
so decided notwithstanding that Rule 8(a) itself was meant to minimize
pleading. Therefore, the history of minimal pleading in criminal cases is
not a sound basis for keeping the criminal pleading standard less
stringent than the civil standard, especially since, again, Rule 7(c) was
not meant to upset the traditional balance between civil and criminal
pleading standards or impose a pleading requirement any less demanding
than Rule 8(a).
As to the point that aligning the civil and criminal pleading
standards would be a return to common law criminal pleading, it is
unavailing because it assumes Twombly and Iqbal require that style of
pleading. But they do not. The type of common law indictments the
drafters of Rule 7(c) eschewed looked something like this:
In the District Court of the United States within and for the [blank]
Division of the District of [blank] sitting at the City of [blank], State
of [blank], at the [blank], 19 [blank] term of said court.
The grand jurors of the United States in and for the District and
Division aforesaid, duly empaneled, sworn, and charged, at the term
aforesaid, by the court aforesaid, on their oaths, find, charge, and
present that on or about the [blank] day of [blank], 19 [blank], at and
in the City of [blank], in [blank] County, State of [blank], and upon
land purchased and acquired by the United States of America for a
United States Post Office and a United States Courthouse building,
the real estate on which such building rests, being otherwise
described as lots numbered [blank], on [blank] Street, all as disclosed
by the recorded plat of the original town site of the City of [blank],

(1901); Patten, 64 N.E. at 851; Latshaw v. State ex rel. Latshaw, 59 N.E. 471, 474 (Ind.
1901); Bloom v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 97 Ind. 478, 479–80 (1884); Blanchard-Hamilton
Furniture Co. v. Colvin, 69 N.E. 1032, 1034 (Ind. App. Ct. 1904); Burkart v. City of
Newport, 97 S.W.2d 803, 805 (Ky. 1936); City of St. Louis v. Weitzel, 31 S.W. 1045,
1048 (Mo. 1895); City of Louisiana v. Anderson, 73 S.W. 875, 876 (Mo. Ct. App. 1903);
Canham v. Bruegman, 109 N.W. 733, 734 (Neb. 1906); Crooks v. People’s Nat’l Bank,
61 N.Y.S. 604, 607–08 (N.Y. App. Div. 1899); Dickenson v. Henderson, 176 P. 797, 798
(Or. 1918); Utah Ass’n of Creditmen v. Boyle Furniture Co., 136 P. 572, 573 (Utah
1913); Richardson, 52 A. at 1068; Selvey v. Grafton Coal & Coke Co., 79 S.E. 656, 657
(W. Va. 1913); State v. Zillman, 98 N.W. 543, 545 (Wis. 1904); Jarvis v. Hamilton, 16
Wis. 574, 577–78 (1863); Blatchley v. Adair, 5 Iowa 545, 546 (1858); accord, e.g., 1
MORRIS M. ESTEE & CARTER P. POMEROY, ESTEE’S PLEADINGS, PRACTICE AND FORMS,
ADAPTED TO ACTIONS AND SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS UNDER CODES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §
827 (3d ed. 1886); FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF REMEDIES FOR TORTS, INCLUDING
REPLEVIN, REAL ACTION, PLEADING, EVIDENCE, DAMAGES 236 n.a, 237 (2d ed. 1873); 3
WILLIAM A. SUTHERLAND, A TREATISE ON CODE PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 5028 (1910);
see also Blue Valley Creamery Co. v. Stone, 80 F.2d 483, 484 (3d Cir. 1935) (applying
the statutory language rule to bankruptcy cases); Meek v. Beezer, 28 F.2d 343, 346 (3d
Cir. 1928) (same); In re Bellah, 116 F. 69, 71–76 (D. Del. 1902) (same).
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[blank] County, State of [blank], and the said real estate and building
thereon being under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States of
America, the same having been purchased and acquired by the
United States for such Post Office and Courthouse purposes by the
consent of the Legislature of, and the laws of the State of [blank] for
the erection of such needful buildings of the United States, and such
buildings and real estate being in the [blank] Division of the District
of [blank], and within the jurisdiction of this court, one A.B. and one
C.D. did then and there knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully, purposely,
deliberately, premeditatedly, feloniously, of their malice
aforethought, and with the intent so to do, kill and murder X.Y., a
human being, the said murder being perpetrated in the manner and
form herein set forth by the said A.B. and C.D., then and there
holding in their respective hands certain respective pistols, revolvers
and small firearms, loaded with powder and leaden steel and metallic
bullets, a more exact description of which firearms and bullets being
to the grand jury unknown, and which said firearms so held
respectively by the said defendants, A.B. and C.D., they, and each of
them, fired, shot and discharged at, towards, against and into the
body, abdomen, chest, and limbs of the said X.Y., thereby mortally
wounding him, the said X.Y.; all of which the said A.B. and C.D. did
with the wilful, unlawful, deliberate, premeditated and felonious
intent aforesaid, and with malice aforethought, as aforesaid, to kill
and murder and take the life of him the said X.Y.; and that the said
X.Y. from the effect of said bullets and the mortal wounds inflicted
thereby did languish, and languishing did die on or about the [blank]
day of April, 19 [blank]; all contrary to the form of the statute in such
case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the
United States of America.303

Twombly and Iqbal demand nothing of that sort.
Furthermore, those decisions simply purported to restore the
original meaning of Rule 8(a). Rule 8(a), in turn, was designed to impose
a lighter pleading standard than code pleading, which was itself designed
to repudiate the technicality, complexity, and opacity of common law
pleading. Thus, Twombly and Iqbal should be viewed as imposing the
lightest pleading standard of all—one less rigid and technical than
common law pleading and less fact-bound than code pleading—
especially given the traditional civil-criminal pleading balance. In other
words, Twombly and Iqbal are a far cry from common law
indictments.304
303. Holtzoff, supra note 103, at 124–25.
304. As noted above, the drafters of Rule 8(a) did draw on the common law insofar
as it allowed for pleading little factual detail. See supra note 99. But flexibility in
averment is not what the drafters of Rule 7(c) were trying to escape. See, e.g., Holtzoff,
supra note 103, at 124 (“The prolix and archaic form of indictment couched in
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3. Raising the Criminal Pleading Standard Would Create
Substantive Rights
The Committee’s final argument contends that raising the criminal
pleading standard would “create new substantive rights, which is beyond
the [Committee’s] authority.”305 That argument is unconvincing,
however, because raising the criminal pleading standard would comport
with the pre-Federal Rules principle that criminal pleading requirements
should be at least as strict as civil ones. Additionally, Twombly and Iqbal
imposed their pleading standard in the civil context without “creating
substantive rights,” so it is unclear why aligning the civil and criminal
pleading standards in accordance with the original design of Rule 7(c)
and the traditional balance between those standards would do so.
Furthermore, given that Twombly and Iqbal simply purported to restore
the original meaning of Rule 8(a), which was designed to make the civil
pleading standard less stringent than code pleading, it is hard to imagine
how applying the Twombly-Iqbal pleading standard to Rule 7(c), which
contains code pleading language, would create rights. Lastly, it cannot be
the case that aligning Rule 7(c) with Rule 8(a) would create substantive
rights simply because the Constitution provides for indictments, notice to
the accused, and due process.306 If that were so, every Federal Rule that
afforded more protection than the constitutional minimum would be
invalid.307
V.

CONCLUSION

Under our current pleading regime, a civil plaintiff must allege
sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim to relief and cannot
merely present legal conclusions, but a prosecutor can plead using
broadly worded statutory language. Hence, civil pleadings are held to
much more exacting requirements than criminal ones. That pleading
Elizabethan English is still used in the federal courts. Actually, instead of apprizing the
defendant of the crime of which he is accused, an indictment of this sort tends to mystify
him. Moreover, much useless and laborious learning has been accumulated and an
incalculable amount of midnight oil burned over the futile problem of how an indictment
should be drawn and what it should contain.”); Medalie, supra note 103, at 3 (“Prevailing
forms of federal indictments, evolved after years of litigation over technical defects,
represent anything but a clear and simple statement of the facts constituting the crime.
The need to guard against microscopic technical flaws had resulted in a plethora of
logomachy in which lurked, well hidden, the substance of the offense.”).
305. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
306. See, e.g., Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 760–61 (1962); cf., e.g.,
United States v. Anderson, 280 F.3d 1121, 1124 (7th Cir. 2002) (describing the minimum
constitutional requirements for an indictment).
307. Cf., e.g., United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 783 (1979) (noting that a
Criminal Rule violation was not a constitutional violation); United States v. Fry, 831 F.2d
664, 667 (6th Cir. 1987) (same).
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balance, however, is misguided. Rule 7(c) was designed to require at
least as much detail as Rule 8(a), and that original design should govern
Rule 7(c) today.
Those conclusions are serious ones. They call into question a deeply
entrenched pleading system that has been accepted or supported by the
highest authorities in the land, and they suggest that those authorities
should rethink their positions. They also indicate that criminal defendants
should, under the Federal Rules, receive more protections and
information about the case against them than they presently do. Finally,
they render policy arguments regarding our pleading regime quite
important. If our existing pleading system is to be retained despite its
weak legal footing, it must at least have powerful normative support. If it
does not or if the normative considerations favor changing our pleading
system—which they seem to308—the need for change is all the more
pressing.

308. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.

